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THE SNOWDEN EFFECT:  THE IMPACT OF SPILLING 
NATIONAL SECRETS 
A SYMPOSIUM SNAPSHOT 
 
 
Lauren A. Mullins* 
 
 
On Friday, January 30, 2015, the Lincoln Memorial 
University Duncan School of Law hosted the biennial Law 
Review Symposium in honor of Professor Sandra C. Ruffin.1  
Members of the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review, 
faculty, staff, speakers, and members of the legal community 
gathered in the Duncan School of Law Courtroom to discuss 
the implications of the national security disclosures by former 
government contractor Edward Snowden.   
                                                 
*Lauren A. Mullins, B.S., Business Administration (University of 
Virginia’s College at Wise); M.B.A. (East Tennessee State University); 
Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2016 (Lincoln Memorial University 
Duncan School of Law);  Editor-in-Chief, LMU Law Review (2015-
2016). 
1 See LMU Law Review to Present Symposium on National Security and 
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The Symposium speakers, who traveled to Knoxville 
from all over the United States, are a fascinating group of 
experts that offered a wide range of valuable perspectives:   
Mr. James Bamford is a leading National Security 
Agency expert, journalist, and bestselling author of The Shadow 
Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA From 9/11 to The Eavesdropping on 
America.  We were fortunate to have Mr. Bamford’s unique 
viewpoint, as he shared some of his rare personal access to 
Edward Snowden--three days in Moscow conducting an 
interview for a Wired magazine cover story.2  Later in this 
volume, we have provided an edited transcript of Mr. 
Bamford’s presentation.   
Mr. Brett Max Kaufman is a Teaching Fellow at New 
York University School of Law.  Formerly a national security 
fellow with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Mr. 
Kaufman brought a pro-privacy perspective with his lecture 
regarding the governments “collect it all” philosophy 
concerning intelligence information. 
Professor J. Richard Broughton is an Associate 
Professor of Law at University of Detroit Mercy School of 
Law.  Professor Broughton’s lecture focused on the Treason 
Clause of the Constitution and the required mental state for its 
application.  He argued that electronic communications that 
reach the enemy do not constitute treason in the absence of a 
specific intent to betray America.  Professor Broughton 
graciously followed up his presentation with an article written 
for this volume dedicated to the Symposium. 
 Professor Melanie Reid is an Associate Professor of 
Law at LMU Duncan School of Law and former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney in the Southern District of Florida.  Professor Reid 
has conducted extensive research into the constitutionality of 
the use of intelligence information in criminal investigations, 
called “parallel construction.”  Professor Reid deserves special 
recognition for her integral role in this Symposium.  She 
developed the Symposium theme, assisted in planning for and 
securing a well-rounded selection of speakers, provided a 
presentation to accompany her recently published article NSA 
and DEA Intelligence Sharing: Why It Is Legal and Why Reuters 
                                                 
2 See James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED, Aug. 
13, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/. 
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and the Good Wife Got It Wrong,3 and submitted additional 
work tailored to this publication.  Thank you, Professor Reid, 
for your hard work and dedication.   
Mr. Chris Inglis is a former Deputy Director and 28-
year veteran of the NSA holding a number of senior 
leadership positions in the organization.  Mr. Inglis’ 
presentation, “National Security in the Age of Cyberspace - 
Can Convergence, Security, Privacy, and Transparency Co-
exist?” offered valuable insight from inside the government 
agency.  His lecture covered the framework and provided real-
world examples of U.S. efforts to achieve the reconciliation of 
the various aims embodied in the Constitution and principles 
that both establish and constrain the work of the federal 
government.  An edited transcript of this presentation is 
published in this volume. 
Ms. Elisabeth Cook is a member of the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent, 
bipartisan agency within the executive branch.  Ms. Cook is a 
practicing attorney, formerly with the U.S. Department of 
Justice, and brought a wealth of knowledge on a wide range of 
issues involving the balancing of government transparency 
and the interests of national security.  Her presentation 
focused on the legal and policy-oriented history that informs 
the current debate surrounding the government’s need to 
protect classified information.  Again, an edited transcript of 
Ms. Cook’s presentation is published in this volume.     
Special Agent Beth O’Brien is with the FBI and 
Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership.  Special Agent 
O’Brien’s presentation focused on the definition of an “insider 
threat” and the FBI’s development of indicators and profiles of 
potential insider threats. 
Finally, Mr. Mark Jaycox is a Legislative Analyst for 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).  His focused 
research includes issues with consumer privacy, civil liberties, 
surveillance law, and cybersecurity and he has completed 
extensive work on legislative efforts to reform the National 
Security Agency and update surveillance law.  Mr. Jaycox 
                                                 
3 See Melanie Reid, NSA and DEA Intelligence Sharing: Why It Is Legal 
and Why Reuters and the Good Wife Got It Wrong, 68 SMU L. REV. 427, 
468 (2015). 
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presented the key items needed for reform, current proposals 
in Congress, and the potential outcomes. 
In addition to the work and transcripts published by 
the Symposium participants in this volume, the following 
articles are included:    
Professor Jason Zenor’s article examines the existing 
legal framework and modern competing needs of national 
security, the defense industry, and the public interest.  In 
examining legal protections for sources of “leaked” 
information, including historical examples, he suggests a new 
policy which favors the free flow of information and promotes 
whistleblowing and government transparency.   
Dr. Daniel Alati’s article examines the effect that 
Edward Snowden’s national security disclosures have had 
thus far on the security establishments in Canada and the 
U.K., noting a lack of intelligence activities oversight in both 
countries.  The article provides insight to the dearth of 
legislative outcomes that have occurred as a result of the U.S. 
leaks and suggests recommendations to prevent reoccurrence 
of the situation. 
 Many people graciously contributed to the success of 
this Symposium.  We would like to give special thanks to:  
Kathy Baughman, Kate Reagan, Andrew McCree, Laura Hash, 
Keri Stophel, David Harmon, Robert Smith-Yanez, Union 
Avenue Books, Miller & Miller Court Reporters, and Dead 






















“Treason” is a damning charge.  Rhetorically, and 
legally.  It was long considered the most serious of offenses, 
even more serious than murder.  Consider, for example, that 
in the Inferno, Dante places the murderers in the Seventh Circle 
of Hell.1  But the traitors occupy the Ninth and lowest Circle.2  
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy.  I am 
grateful to Nadine Hammoud, Zeina Rammal, Samia Abbas, and 
Patrina Bergamo for their research and editorial assistance, and to 
the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review for inviting me to 
participate in this Symposium. 
1 See DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO  95-99 (Mark Musa, ed. & trans., 
Indiana Critical Ed. 1995) (1308). 
2 Id. at 230-35.  Here, in Canto XXXIII, Dante travels through 
Antenora, where he encounters famous traitors.  At one point, he 
sees two heads frozen inside of a single hole, with the head on top 
gnawing on the brain of the lower head.  Id. at 233.  See also Paul G. 
Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante’s Inferno and the Social 
Construction of Crime, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 787, 808-13 (2001) 
(discussing Dante’s treatment of political crimes of betrayal). 
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Blackstone labeled treason the worst of offenses,3 and other 
authorities have followed that notion.4  But “treason” is 
precisely how many government officials and political leaders 
described Edward Snowden’s disclosure of sensitive national 
security information.5  Senator Dianne Feinstein, then-chair of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Snowden committed 
“an act of treason.”6  House Intelligence Committee chair Mike 
Rogers of Michigan had similar words: “That is what we call a 
traitor in this country.  He has traded something of value for 
his own personal gain that jeopardizes the national security of 
the United States.  We call that treason.”7  Former House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich said on NBC’s Meet the Press about 
Snowden: “[t]his was treason.”8  And Richard Clarke, former 
White House counter-terrorism advisor and appointed 
                                                 
3 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *75. 
4 See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125 (1807) (opinion 
of Marshall, C.J.) (remarking that “there is no crime which can more 
excite and agitate the passions of men than treason”); Stephan v. 
United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1943) (observing that 
“[t]reason is the most serious offense that may be committed against 
the United States”); Erin Creegan, National Security Crime, 3 HARV. 
NAT’L. SEC. J. 373, 376 (2012) (calling treason “the most serious of all 
offenses against the nation”). 
5 The Snowden affair is, of course, the subject of this symposium and 
the basic facts are likely well-known to most readers.  For a good 
description of the controversy, though, see Bryan Burrough, et al., 
The Snowden Saga: A Shadowland of Secrets and Light, VANITY FAIR, 
available at 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2014/05/edward-
snowden-politics-interview (May 2014).   The Snowden affair was 
also the subject of a recently released documentary.  See CITIZENFOUR 
(Praxis Films 2014). 
6 See Jeremy Herb & Justin Sink, Sen. Feinstein calls Snowden’s NSA 
leaks an ‘act of treason,’ THE HILL (June 10, 2013, 10:19 PM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/304573-sen-feinstein-snowdens-
leaks-are-treason. 
7 See Laura Barron-Lopez, Rogers says Snowden committed treason, THE 
HILL (Dec. 22, 2013, 11:15 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/193832-rep-rogers-says-
snowden-committed-treason.  
8 See Transcript, Meet the Press, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-transcript-
june-1-2014-n121571 (remarks of Newt Gingrich). 
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member of President Barack Obama’s expert panel on the 
National Security Agency, said, “What Mr. Snowden did is 
treason, was high crimes.”9 
The fervor to brand Edward Snowden a traitor and 
convict him of treason is an understandable political response 
to his conduct.  Perhaps “treason” is simply convenient 
shorthand for describing serious criminal conduct involving 
an intentional breach of national security, not meant to 
describe the actual legal status of the conduct.  An epithet, but 
not a serious legal claim.10  But even if understandable, it 
nevertheless reflects potential shortcomings in the public 
understanding – and apparently, the understanding of our 
political leaders, in particular – about the law of American 
treason.   
This, too, is understandable.  Treason has been called 
one of the great forgotten clauses of the Constitution.11  
Despite its pedigree in our law, treason has received relatively 
little academic attention.  J. Willard Hurst’s collection of essays 
on treason remains the leading academic treatment of the 
subject,12 but only recently – over the past decade since the 
                                                 
9 Brian Ross & Lee Ferran, White House NSA Panel Member: Edward 
Snowden’s Leaks Still ‘Treasonous,’ ABCNEWS (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/white-house-nsa-panel-member-
snowdens-leaks-treasonous/story?id=21277856.  
10 See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An 
Explanation and Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42 
VAND. J. TRANSNT’L L. 1443 (2009) (“Treason is both an ancient crime 
and a popular epithet”). 
 Or, perhaps, the rhetoric of treason can even fall into the 
category of joke-making.  During the 2015 Academy Awards 
broadcast, host Neil Patrick Harris joked, after Citizenfour had 
received the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature, that 
Snowden “could not be here tonight for some treason.”  See THR 
Staff, Edward Snowden: I Laughed at Neil Patrick Harris’ Treason Joke, 
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 23, 2015, 12:44 PM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/edward-snowden-i-
laughed-at-777125. 
11 See Carlton F.W. Lawson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of 
Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 865 
(2006). 
12 See J. WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES: 
COLLECTED ESSAYS (1971).  See also Willard Hurst, Treason in the 
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September 11 attacks – has the Treason Clause begun to 
receive greater attention from contemporary scholars.13  
Professor George Fletcher lamented many years ago that 
treason is no longer part of a law school course on criminal 
law.14  The law of American treason thus remains 
underdeveloped, incomplete, and lousy with gaps.  But that 
might actually be a good thing.  A more well-developed 
treason law would likely require that treason be far more 
common.  Yet treason prosecutions have been sufficiently rare 
in our history that relatively few opportunities have arisen for 
courts and lawyers to adequately answer the many questions 
that could arise from an accusation of, and prosecution for, 
treason.   
Treason was a subject of some interest in the early 
years of the Republic – Benedict Arnold is perhaps our most 
famous traitor, though his betrayal at West Point occurred 
before the Constitution was drafted,15 and the treason trial of 
Aaron Burr perhaps the most prominent one of its kind during 
the era, produced some early Supreme Court precedent on the 
meaning of American treason law.16  Quite naturally, treason 
                                                                                                       
United States, 58 HARV. L. REV. 226 & 395 (1945) (explaining law of 
treason in essays that would later form Hurst’s book on treason). 
13 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 11; Eichensehr, supra note 10; Paul T. 
Crane, Did the Court Kill the Treason Charge?: Reassessing Cramer v. 
United States and Its Significance, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 635 (2009); 
Henry Mark Holzer, Why Not Call It Treason?: From Korea to 
Afghanistan, 29 S.U. L. REV. 181 (2002); Suzanne Kelly Babb, Fear and 
Loathing in America: Application of Treason Law in Times of National 
Crisis and the Case of John Walker Lindh, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1721 (2003); 
George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1611 
(2004).  For a collection of the scholarship that discusses treason 
history, see Lawson, supra note 11, at 866 n.7.   
14 See George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REV. 193, 194 
(1982). 
15 For an excellent account of General Washington’s response to the 
Arnold affair, in a chapter appropriately entitled “Treason,” see 
JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, WASHINGTON: THE INDISPENSABLE MAN 141-
48 (1974).   
16 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).  For an excellent 
account of the Burr trial, see R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL 
OF AARON BURR: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE CHARACTER WARS OF THE 
NEW NATION (2012). 
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was also a subject of debate during the Civil War period.17 But 
it was not until World War II that treason prosecutions 
became prominent again.  The 1940s saw a substantial number 
of treason prosecutions.18  Then there was the infamous 
incident involving Jane Fonda’s embrace of the North 
Vietnamese, which led to public branding of her as a traitor 
and the unflattering nickname of “Hanoi Jane.”19  Finally, it 
was in the post-September 11 world and the American effort 
to grapple with the problem of its own citizens joining forces 
with international terrorists that treason reemerged as a more 
serious prosecutorial option for the federal government. 
John Walker Lindh offers an example.  Though he 
traveled to the Middle East to study Arabic, Lindh later 
trained with a terrorist group and crossed from Pakistan into 
Afghanistan and joined a group of fighters that were funded 
by Osama bin Laden.20  The group sent him to fight with the 
Taliban against the Northern Alliance.21  He eventually 
surrendered to the Northern Alliance, and was recaptured 
after being temporarily freed during an armed attack by 
Taliban detainees upon a CIA operative who had been 
interviewing Lindh.22  Lindh was indicted and eventually 
pleaded guilty to charges of providing services to the Taliban 
and carrying an explosive device during commission of a 
felony.23  He is serving a twenty-year sentence in federal 
prison today.   And Yasser Esam Hamdi, a native of Louisiana, 
rather than being prosecuted in a civilian American court was 
instead detained on a Naval brig and never charged by the 
                                                 
17 See JONATHAN W. WHITE, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND TREASON IN THE 
CIVIL WAR (2011). 
18 See Crane, supra note 13, at 638-39, 677-78. 
19 See Holzer, supra note 13, at 210-13.  Unlike Holzer, Fletcher does 
not see Fonda’s conduct as treasonous.  See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 
200. 
20 See Indictment, United States v. Lindh, No. 02-37a (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 
2002). 
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  Some have argued that the Government should have charged 
Lindh with treason.  See, e.g., Holzer, supra note 13, at 220-21; 
Douglas W. Kmiec, Try Lindh for Treason, It’s Not Too Late, National 
Review Online, (posted Feb. 12, 2002). 
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Department of Justice with a crime.24  His case eventually 
went to the Supreme Court, which held that the President 
enjoyed the power to detain Hamdi as an enemy combatant, 
but that he was entitled to some process to challenge his 
detention.25  But it was Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi that 
invoked treason.  Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, argued that 
where an American citizen is captured fighting for the enemy, 
the government has two options: suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus, or try him for treason or some other crime.26  In 
Hamdi’s case, the Government did neither. 
Finally, in 2006, the Government obtained its first 
treason indictment since World War II, when it charged Adam 
Gadahn with treason after Gadahn appeared in al Qaeda 
videos.27  In them, he appeared with bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri, praised the September 11 attacks and encouraged al 
Qaeda to use its capability to attack the United States again.28   
Gadahn was never captured and tried; rather, he was killed in 
January 2015 during a counterterrorism operation.29 
Perhaps treason has fallen out of favor with federal 
prosecutors because of the enhanced evidentiary requirements 
that necessarily come with a treason prosecution.  Perhaps it is 
because other statutes exist that reach the same types of 
conduct without the burdens that come with the definition of 
treason – material support for terrorism, rebellion or 
insurrection, seditious conspiracy, advocating overthrow of 
the government, and recruiting others for service in armed 
hostility against the United States all come to mind.  Perhaps it 
                                                 
24 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
25 Id. at 524, 533. 
26 Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
27 See First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Gadahn, SA CR 
05-254 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006). 
28 Id. 
29 See Greg Botelho & Ralph Ellis, Adam Gadahn, American mouthpiece 
for al Qaeda, killed, CNN.COM, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/23/world/adam-gadahn-al-qaeda/ 
(posted Apr. 23, 2015). For a brief discussion of the Gadahn case, and 
a suggestion that the Government used the wrong theory of treason 
with respect to Gadahn’s conduct, see Kristen Eichensehr, Treason’s 
Return, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 229 (2007).  Crane’s article on 
Cramer also discusses the Gadahn case.  See Crane, supra note 13, at 
636. 
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is some combination of these.30  Perhaps, as George Fletcher 
has argued, the decline of treason has less to do with proof of 
the elements and more to do with changing attitudes toward 
crime and criminal law.31  The feudal bases of treason are 
simply inconsistent with the liberal version of the criminal law 
that prevails today, a criminal law that prefers “systematic and 
scientific control of violence” to the symbolism of ancient 
treason law.32  But perhaps, in some cases at least, the trouble 
is not with proving the traitor’s actions but, rather, his intent.  
Intention, Hurst observed, is “at the heart” of treason.33  How 
does American treason law apply to one who communicates 
information that can be, and in fact is, both helpful and readily 
available to the enemy, or commits an overt act that in fact 
assists the enemy, but who does not simultaneously 
specifically intend to betray the United States?  American 
criminal law has long valued the imposition of mens rea, both 
as a check on the power of the state and as a method for 
measuring culpability.34   And a charge as serious as treason 
most surely requires proof of some heightened state of moral 
culpability at the time of the alleged overt act. 
The Snowden case therefore presents a distinctly 
modern wrinkle in the application of treason law, one that is 
implicated by the popular cry of “treason” against Snowden.  
It raises the problem that one may aid and comfort the enemy 
without actually intending to do so as a way of betraying 
America.  Can we (should we) still call that treason?  That is 
the specific problem I want to explore.  To do that, I will 
describe the American law of treason by giving special 
attention to the provision for adhering to the enemy, giving 
them aid and comfort (what I will call Adherence Treason, to 
distinguish it from Levying War Treason) and the mental state 
that American treason law requires for a conviction on this 
ground.  My project, then, is to explain why it is the mens rea 
element of treason law that complicates that law’s application 
to Snowden’s case, and indeed in any case in which an 
                                                 
30 See Crane, supra note 13, at 680-93. 
31 See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1628. 
32 Id. 
33 HURST, supra note 12, at 15. 
34 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.01, at 
117 (6th ed. 2012). 
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American has aided the enemy through an electronic 
communication. 
 
II. AMERICAN TREASON LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
TREASON MENS REA 
 
Treason is the only crime that the federal Constitution 
explicitly defines.  “Treason against the United States,” the 
text says, 
 
shall consist only in levying war against them, 
or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid 
and comfort.  No person shall be convicted of 
treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act, or on 
confession in open court.  The Congress shall 
have the power to declare the punishment of 
treason, but no attainder of treason shall work 
corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during 
the life of the person attained.35   
 
Congress has also codified treason as a federal crime, at 
section 2381 of Title 18.  But because the crime of treason is 
constitutionalized, Congress cannot alter or modify the 
definition of treason by ordinary legislation.  So Section 2381 
provides that: “Whoever, owing allegiance to the United 
States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, 
giving them aid and comfort within the United States or 
elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall 
be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this 
title not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding 
any office under the United States.”36  As treason is punishable 
by death, Congress has enacted a set of procedures for capital 
treason prosecutions that is distinct from the procedures 
employed in typical capital murder prosecutions at the federal 
level.37   
                                                 
35 U.S. CONST. art. III, §3. 
36 18 U.S.C. §2381 (2012). 
37 In a capital treason prosecution, the list of statutory aggravating 
factors is shorter than for capital homicide prosecutions, 18 U.S.C. § 
3591(a) (2012), and the Government need not prove the specific 
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Notice the word “only” in the constitutional text: there 
are only two ways to commit treason – by levying war against 
the United States, or by giving aid and comfort to the enemy 
(which is how one adheres to the enemy).  This is a product of 
design.  The Framers of the Constitution explicitly desired a 
limited treason in America.38  The crime was meant to be 
narrow, more narrow even, than its chief English antecedent.  
The Statute of 25 Edward III, enacted in 1351, created seven 
basic categories of treason for purposes of English law:  
compassing or imagining the death of the king, or queen, or 
their eldest son and heir; violating the wife of the king or the 
wife of the king’s eldest son; levying war against the king in 
his realm; adhering to the king’s enemies in his realm, giving 
them aid and comfort in the realm or elsewhere; 
counterfeiting; killing the chancellor, the treasurer, or the 
king’s justices; murder of a master by a servant, a husband by 
a wife, or a prelate by a cleric (this was called “petty treason”; 
the other categories were “high treason”).39  This statute did 
away with the common law of treason in England and was 
greatly admired not only by English authorities,40 but also by 
American colonists and the founders, who drew upon its 
language in crafting colonial treason law and the 
constitutional definition.41  With the development of treason 
law in America in the aftermath of the Revolution, however, it 
became clear that certain forms of English treason would not 
apply here.42  Of course, many of the categories of English 
treason were predicated upon acts taken against the 
monarchy, and America would not be a monarchy.  
Americans could have adopted some of these provisions and 
                                                                                                       
statutory mental state factors related to death that are required in a 
capital homicide prosecution.  Compare 18 U.S.C. §3591(a)(1) with 18 
U.S.C.  §3591(a)(2)(A-D). 
38 See HURST, supra note 12, at 130. 
39 Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. III, ch. 2 (1351). 
40 See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 2 (London, 5th ed. 1671). 
41 See HURST, supra note 12, at 130-40.  Curiously, as Hurst explains, 
the original draft of the Constitution did not contain a treason 
provision.  Id. at 129.  The Committee of Detail created and inserted 
the Treason Clause into the Constitution.  Id.  The Convention then 
fully discussed the new language on August 20, 1787.  Id. at 130. 
42 Id. at 106, 126. 
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simply made them acts against elected political leaders, but 
many of these notions were never considered. 
Moreover, the leading founder on treason, 
Pennsylvania’s James Wilson (who served on the Committee 
of Detail that drafted the Treason Clause), argued that 25 
Edward III was the chief basis for our treason law and that 
American treason should be interpreted in light of that 
statute.43  Other leading authorities agreed.44 Wilson remarked 
that the charge of treason was a dangerous charge, so it was 
important to limit the Government’s power to bring it, thus 
further explaining the narrowness of American treason under 
the Constitution.45  And Chief Justice Marshall, in narrowly 
construing the text of the Treason Clause in Ex Parte Bollman, 
said that “[a]s there is no crime which can more excite and 
agitate the passions of men than treason, no charge demands 
more from the tribunal before which it is made a deliberate 
and temperate inquiry.”46  The Constitution offers a limited 
notion of treason, Marshall wrote, “[t]o prevent the possibility 
of those calamities which result from the extension of treason 
to offenses of minor importance.”47  Constructive treasons, in 
particular, were viewed by the founding generation as a threat 
to political liberty, so the evolution of American treason law 
was careful to avoid these dangers.48  Hamilton, in responding 
                                                 
43 See HURST, supra note 12, at 135. 
44 Id. at 130-31. 
45 JAMES WILSON, 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1149-50 
(Mark David Hall & Kermit Hall, ed. 2007), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/wilson-collected-works-of-james-
wilson-vol-2.  Wilson says, referring to Montesquieu’s observations, 
that treason “is indeterminate,” which “along is sufficient to make 
any government degenerate into arbitrary power.”  Id. at 1149.  He 
continues that in both monarchies and republics, treason law 
“furnishes an opportunity to unprincipled courtiers, and to 
demagogues equally unprincipled, to harass the independent citizen, 
and the faithful subject, by treasons, and by prosecutions for 
treasons, constructive, capricious, and oppressive.”  Id. 
46 Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125 (1807). 
47 Id. at 125-26. 
48 See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945) (discussing the 
negative view of constructive treasons among the founding 
generation).  See also Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 
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to the complaint that the original Constitution contained no 
bill of rights, even included the Treason Clause among those 
constitutional provisions (beyond the structural ones) that 
offered protections to the individual against government 
action.49 
So the first principle we can derive from the definition 
of American treason – and one that would militate against a 
treason charge for someone like Snowden – is that it is 
deliberately narrow and does not embrace constructive or 
questionable treasons. 
The other thing worth noticing about the text’s 
definition of the crime is that it does not include an explicit 
mens rea term.  Or does it?  In some ways, this should be 
unsurprising.  The English Treasons Statute, 25 Edward III, 
did not contain familiar common law mens rea terminology.  
And still, by the time of the framing, mens rea was well-
known to the English courts, the English common law, and to 
colonial criminal law.50  Blackstone highlighted the state of 
mind that makes for treason noted in light of the English law, 
stating that “a bare intent to commit treason is many times 
actual treason: as imagining the death of the king, or 
conspiring to take away his crown.”51  Early treason case law 
referred to treasonous intention.52  And Justice Story spoke of 
“intention” and “treasonable purpose” while adjudicating a 
treason case in Rhode Island53 (though he offered his 
statement of the law with respect to levying war, rather than 
                                                                                                       
1943) (stating “[t]he Constitution has left no room for constructive 
treason”). 
49 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter, ed., 1961). 
50 See Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal 
Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815 (1980).  See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW §5.1(a), at 253 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that since about 
1600, common law judges defined crimes to contain some bad state 
of mind, and setting forth conventional common law mens rea 
terms). 
51 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *35. 
52 See United States v. Hoxie, 26 F. Cas. 397, 399 (C.C.D. Vt. 1808) (No 
15,407); United States v. Pryor, 27 F. Cas. 628, 630 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) 
(No. 16,096). 
53 See Charge to the Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1046, 1047 (C.C. 
D. R.I. 1842) (No. 18.275).   
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adhering to the enemy, and defined the treasonable purpose 
broadly).54  But none of these early authorities meaningfully 
explained the precise culpable mental state that the 
government must prove to establish treason. 
Despite the lack of clarity in the constitutional or 
statutory text as to the precise mens rea required for treason, it 
is generally agreed today that treason requires a specific intent 
to betray the United States.  Perhaps the most important 
treason case of the modern Supreme Court is Cramer v. United 
States,55 decided in 1945, and it is here where we first 
encounter the modern Court’s discussion of treason mens rea.   
In 1942, German submarines arrived at the coasts of 
Long Island and Florida.56  Four men exited each sub and 
buried their Nazi uniforms and then dressed as civilians.57  
They had trained at a sabotage school in Germany and were 
supposed to destroy American war infrastructure.58  Although 
all of the men had lived in the United States, all but one were 
German citizens. 59  They were eventually arrested and tried in 
military tribunals, which the Supreme Court validated in Ex 
parte Quirin.60  Cramer was born in Germany but was 
naturalized in the United States in 1936.61  He befriended 
Warner Thiel, who would become one of the aforementioned 
                                                 
54 See Lawson, supra note 11, at 911 (explaining Story’s view).  
Lawson also helpfully notes that an early Nevada statute, defining 
“levying war” treason for state law purposes, contained an explicit 
mens rea element: “when persons arise in insurrection with the 
intent to prevent, in general, by force and intimidation, the execution 
of statute in this state, or to force its repeal.”   Id. at 912 (citing NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §196.020 (LexisNexis 2011)).  The statute includes, 
but does not define, adhering to the enemies of Nevada, giving them 
aid and comfort. 
55 325 U.S. 1 (1945).  Crane’s article offers a valuable history of the 
case, as well as of the Justice’s decision-making.  See generally Crane, 
supra note 13. 




60 Id. at 48.  The Court held that Herbert Hans Haupt, one of the 
saboteurs, could be tried by military commission, rather than by 
civilian court for treason, even though he may have been an 
American citizen.  Id. at 38. 
61 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 3-4. 
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Nazi saboteurs.62  They were roommates and even engaged in 
a joint business venture.63  Responding to an anonymous note, 
Cramer went to Grand Central Station and met Thiel for 
drinks.64  They then met two more times and Thiel gave 
Cramer a money belt with $3,600 in it.65  Cramer kept a 
portion, set aside a portion in case Thiel needed it, and then 
put the rest in a safe deposit box.66  The FBI observed two of 
the meetings and arrested Cramer.67  Cramer was tried for 
treason, but said he lacked any treasonous intent and that his 
overt acts did not, on their face, manifest treason.68 
The Supreme Court held for Cramer.  In the course of 
doing so, the Court held that Congress could criminalize 
treasonous conduct under other statutory crimes without all of 
the procedural safeguards and limitations that attend treason 
itself.69  The Court also recognized that the overt act need not 
manifest treasonous intent.70  However, the overt act must 
actually give aid and comfort to the enemy.71  Cramer’s 
meetings with Thiel did not satisfy this standard.72   With 
respect to the mental element of the crime, the Court 
grounded treason mens rea in the textual requirement of 
“adherence” to the enemy.  “A citizen may favor the enemy 
and harbor sympathies or convictions disloyal to this 
country’s policy or interest, but so long as he commits no act 
of aid or comfort to the enemy, there is no treason,” Justice 
Jackson’s opinion declared.73 
  
                                                 
62 Id. at 4. 
63 Id. at 3-4. 
64 Id. at 5. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 31.  See also Crane, supra note 13, at 642 (describing Cramer’s 
claims before the Court).  According to Crane, Cramer claimed he 
did not possess treasonous intent because he was unaware of Thiel’s 
sabotage plans and met with Thiel simply as a friend.  Id. 
69 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 39-40. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 29. 
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On the other hand, a citizen may take actions, 
which do aid and comfort the enemy – making 
a speech critical of the government or opposing 
its measures, profiteering, striking in defense 
plants or essential work, and the hundred other 
things which impair our cohesion and diminish 
our strength – but if there is no adherence to the 
enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, 
there is no treason.74   
 
The opinion elaborated upon treason mens rea by stating that 
“[q]uestions of intent in a treason case are even more 
complicated than in most criminal cases because of the 
peculiarity of the two different elements which together make 
the offense.”75  Treasonous intent cannot be shown through 
overt acts that are negligent or undesigned.76  Rather, “to make 
treason the defendant must not only intend the act, but he 
must intend to betray his country by means of the act.”77  
Treasonous intent can be inferred from conduct (including the 
relevant overt act itself), and one is deemed to intend the 
natural consequences of his actions.78  Here, however, the 
overt acts that the Government alleged were relatively trivial 
and did not themselves demonstrate treasonous intent.79  The 
Court also proved unwilling to find treason merely from an 
alleged treasonous intent in meeting with Thiel and another 
man named Edward Kerling (leader of the saboteurs), 
concluding that those acts did not actually have the effect of 
giving aid and comfort to the enemy.80  To conclude otherwise 
would “carry us back to constructive treasons.”81 
The first time that the Court ever affirmed a treason 
conviction was in Haupt v. United States.82  There, a father of 
one of the Nazi saboteurs and an American citizen – Hans 
                                                 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 31. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 31-32. 
79 Id. at 39-40. 
80 Id. at 40. 
81 Id. 
82 330 U.S. 631 (1947). 
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Max Haupt – was convicted of treason after giving his son 
(Herbert Hans Haupt) shelter, finding him a job, and giving 
him a car, all while knowing that his son was on the sabotage 
mission.83  Relying on the understanding of the overt act from 
Cramer, the Court held that these acts by Haupt were sufficient 
to actually give aid and comfort to the enemy.84  But the Court 
was also satisfied that Haupt possessed the requisite 
treasonous intent.85  Because Haupt knew of his son’s role, his 
aid to his son was not mere fatherly care.  It was done with the 
purpose of assisting his son in executing the German sabotage 
effort, not just of aiding his son as a son.86 
Following the lessons of Haupt and Cramer in the world 
of treason mens rea is Kawakita v. United States,87 another case 
arising out of actions amid World War II.  There, Tomoya 
Kawakita was a dual Japanese-American citizen who traveled 
to Japan to study at Meiji University.88 He renewed his 
passport in 1941 and took the oath of allegiance to America.89  
After school, and after registering with a family census 
registry in Japan (the Koseki), he later accepted a job with 
Oeyama Nickel Industry Company, that provided metals for 
the Japanese war effort.90  That company also employed 
American prisoners of war, and Kawakita was originally hired 
as an interpreter for communications between the Japanese 
and the American POWs.91  Kawakita’s treason charge was 
based on several different alleged overt acts, all of which 
involved severe maltreatment of the American POWs who 
                                                 
83 Id. at 632-33.  The son Herbert, of course, was among those 
convicted in Quirin.   
84 Id. at 636. 
85 Id. at 641-42. 
86 Id.  
87 343 U.S. 717 (1952). 
88 Id. at 720.   The threshold issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether Kawakita had renounced his American citizenship, thus 
exempting him from American treason law (because, if true, he 
would no longer owe allegiance to the United States).  Id. at 720-36.  
The Court rejected his claim, finding that he retained his dual 
citizenship.  Id. at 736.  This issue was the basis for Chief Justice 
Vinson’s dissent.  Id. at 745-46 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 720. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 720-21. 
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worked at the company.92  He was tried for, and convicted of, 
treason when, after returning to the United States in 1946, a 
former American POW at the nickel company recognized 
Kawakita.93 
In affirming the conviction, Justice Douglas’s opinion 
for the Court explained that treason requires both giving aid 
and comfort to the enemy (the physical act required) and 
treasonous intent (the mens rea).  “One may think disloyal 
thoughts and have his heart on the side of the enemy.  Yet if he 
commits no act giving aid and comfort to the enemy, he is not 
guilty of treason,” Douglas wrote.94   “He may on the other 
hand commit acts which do give aid and comfort to the enemy 
and yet not be guilty of treason, as for example when he acts 
impulsively with no intent to betray.”95  The Court then 
explained that although the constitutional requirement of two 
witnesses applies to the physical overt act, the requirement 
does not extend to the mens rea.96  Rather, the Court said, the 
treasonous intent is inferred from conduct, from the overt acts, 
from the defendant’s statements about the war, and, as here, 
from the defendant’s professions of loyalty to the enemy 
nation.97   
Against this judicial backdrop, one can see why a 
treason prosecution against Edward Snowden would be a 
daunting task.  Snowden himself has publicly discussed the 
controversy (in Moscow, he has apparently built his own 
studio for conducting interviews).98  He has stated publicly 
                                                 
92 Id. at 737-39. 
93 Id. at 722. 
94 Id. at 736. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 742-43. 
98 See Katrina vanden Heuvel & Stephen F. Cohen, Edward Snowden: 
A ‘Nation’ Interview, THE NATION (Oct. 28, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/186129/snowden-exile-
exclusive-interview#; James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the 
World, WIRED, Aug. 13, 2014, 
http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/; Alan 
Rusbridger & Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden interview – the edited 
transcript, THE GUARDIAN (July 18, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-
snowden-nsa-whistleblower-interview-transcript; Burrough, et al., 
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that his desire – his intent, if you will – was to alert the public 
to the scope of the American surveillance regime and to spur 
changes that would mitigate the surveillance state and hold 
public officials accountable.99  At no point does he state that it 
was his intention to aid the enemy in a war against America or 
to assist in planning an attack on the United States.  Now, of 
course, one might imagine that he would never publicly say 
that, even if it were true.  He is fully aware that he faces 
criminal charges and his statements seem naturally self-
serving.  But the point is that in the absence of such a 
confession, the prosecution would have to obtain other 
objective evidence of a desire to do just that, to adhere to the 
enemy by intending to betray the United States.  At least on 
the existing publicly-available evidence, that would be 
difficult indeed.  One need not agree with his actions in order 
to concede that there is insufficient evidence of his adherence 
to the enemy. 
Now, this is not to say that such evidence is impossible 
to discover.  In Kawakita, for example, the defendant made 
repeated statements about his desire to see America harmed.  
The statements included “It looks like MacArthur took a run-
out powder on you boys;” “The Japanese were a little superior 
to your American soldiers;” You Americans don’t have no 
chance.  We will win the war;” “Well, you guys needn’t be 
interested in when the war will be over because you won’t go 
back; you will stay here and work.  I will go back to the States 
because I am an American citizen;” “We will kill all you 
prisoners right here anyway, whether you win the war or lose 
it.  You will never get back to the States;” “I will be glad when 
all of the Americans is dead, and then I can go home and live 
happy.”100  If the Government could find such statements from 
Snowden – for example, that he hoped his disclosures would 
assist the enemy in perpetrating an attack, or that an attack on 
                                                                                                       
supra note 3.  See also Inside the Mind of Edward Snowden: Interview 
with Brian Williams, NBC NEWS, available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview 
(aired May 29, 2014) (appearing on television for interview with 
NBC anchor Brian Williams). 
99 James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED, Aug. 13, 
2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/. 
100 Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 743. 
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American interests, citizens, or military capabilities would 
teach us a valuable lesson about our national intelligence 
policies – then the case for treason would be measurably 
stronger.  But if Snowden’s desire was merely to alert the 
public to policies with which he disagreed, then, however 
misguided his tactics, that state of mind is an unlikely 
candidate for treasonous intent.101 
The “intent” of treason, then, seems a lot like motive.  
Indeed it is.  One may object that intent and motive are not the 
same.  And they are not.  But “intent,” as such, is a difficult 
word to understand in isolation.  The criminal law, 
particularly in the world of specific intent crimes, often makes 
motive relevant to proof of the offense.102  For example, one of 
the ways in which we distinguish a traditional specific-intent 
crime is to say that it is one that requires some special 
motivation for its commission (such as when we require “the 
intent to steal” or the “intent to kill”).103  Moreover, other 
crimes, such as hate crimes,104 are defined by the special 
motive that attends their commission.  Though the relevant act 
(e.g., causing bodily harm) may be performed intentionally or 
knowingly, it is a hate crime only when the act is performed 
with a particular bias motivation (e.g., because of the victim’s 
actual or perceived race or religion).105  Treason is 
substantially similar.  The Government must prove that the 
underlying overt act of providing aid and comfort to the 
enemy was done with a purpose to betray the United States 
and that purpose will often merge with the particular motive 
to see harm befall the country.  Still, courts have been reluctant 
to make too much of this overlap.  In two of the World War II 
treason prosecutions involving Americans who worked as 
radio broadcasters for the Germans – Chandler v. United 
States106 and Best v. United States107 – the defendants argued 
                                                 
101 This conclusion makes comments like those of Speaker Gingrich 
on Meet the Press all the more perplexing.  Gingrich said that 
Snowden “may be a patriotic traitor.  He may think, in his own 
mind, he did the right thing.  This was treason.”  See Meet the Press 
Transcript, supra note 8. 
102 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, §10.04[A][2], at 123. 
103 Id. at 138. 
104 See 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012). 
105 Id. 
106 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948). 
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that even though they intended to aid the German war effort 
and to create disunity and harm to American morale during 
the war, they had the special motive of rendering such aid 
because, they argued, it would be better for Americans by 
halting the pursuit of world domination by Jewish 
Communism.108  In each case, the First Circuit rejected the 
claim that this motive negated their intent to betray, because 
each defendant had the purpose of aiding the enemy.109  
Contrary to the First Circuit’s analysis,110 though, motive was 
actually not irrelevant in these cases.  The defendants had a 
treasonous motive – in addition to their purpose to render aid 
to Germany, they also were motivated directly by a desire to 
see Germany prevail in the war (which would necessarily 
mean an American defeat).111  It was simply mixed with yet 
another, somewhat more attenuated, motive.  In this sense, the 
mixed motives appear similar to the mixed motives of Hans 
Max Haupt.112  It is difficult to imagine a case in which the 
actor has the purpose of aiding the enemy in harming or 
defeating the United States, and yet he is acting solely with a 
motive that does not involve such harm or defeat but rather 
                                                                                                       
107 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950). 
108 See Chandler, 171 F.2d at 925.  In each case, the defendant had 
served as a broadcaster for a German radio station.  See id. at 926; 
Best, 184 F.2d at 134.  The purpose of the broadcasts was to engage in 
“psychological warfare” to support the German war effort.  Chandler, 
171 F.2d at 926. The radio broadcasts were directed by the German 
Propaganda Ministry.  Id.  Broadcasting for the enemy was a popular 
basis for a treason charge during this period.  See also Gillars v. 
United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (involving broadcasting 
for the Germans); D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 
1951) (involving broadcasting for the Japanese). 
109 Chandler, 171 F.2d at 942-45; Best, 184 F.2d at 137-38. 
110 Chandler, 171 F.2d at 944 (holding that one who “trafficks with 
enemy agents” and gives them aid and comfort “is guilty of treason, 
whatever his motive.”). 
111 Id. at 944. 
112 See HURST, supra note 12, at 245 (arguing that Haupt holds that as 
long as one of the mixed motives is to betray the United States, the 
existence of a more pure motive is irrelevant).  Hurst argues that 
Chandler and Best are related, but distinct, on the question of motive.  
Id.  As indicated here, I find them more similar on this point than 
does Hurst. 
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would benefit America.  The specific “intent” of treason, and 
the bad motive that distinguishes it, simply converge.  
One may argue (the Government certainly did in 
Cramer)113 that the Court’s approach makes treason too 
difficult to prove.  Treason, one may contend, could be an 
especially powerful prosecutorial tool in times of national 
emergency or, as today, when grave dangers can be posed to 
national security as a result of advances in technology that 
make communicating with the enemy so easy.  The Court’s 
response to this, and one that arguably would fit the view of 
the Constitution’s Framers, was simple: treason is supposed to 
be hard to prove.114  Its difficulty helps to protect against 
politically vindictive prosecutions or the punishment of those 
who merely think disloyal thoughts.  Yet, as Haupt and 
Kawakita certainly show us, the task is not impossible.  Specific 
intent is not, and has never been, an insurmountable barrier to 
conviction, even in treason law.115  And in light of the ways in 
which electronic or digital communication can ease the 
provision of aid and comfort to America’s enemies, Adherence 
Treason could arguably form a larger share of federal 
prosecutorial energy and resources in the coming years.  After 
all, as the many stories of Americans who have lately sought 
to join forces with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
demonstrate, many of those who have joined the cause of 
America’s enemies have not been shy about expressing their 
adherence to those that would harm us.116   
                                                 
113 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45. 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
115 See Haupt, 330 U.S. at 641-42; Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 743. 
116 See, e.g., Ed Payne, More Americans volunteering to help ISIS, CNN 
(posted Mar. 5, 2015, 4:55 PM), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/05/us/isis-us-arrests/; see also 
Gadahn Indictment, supra note 27.   
 Incidentally, whether ISIS (or, ISIL) currently constitutes an 
“enemy” of the United States for purposes of treason law is perhaps 
an open question, particularly in the absence of a specific 
authorization for the use of force against that group.  I leave that 
question for another time, and assume for the purposes of this article 
that ISIS could be an enemy for treason purposes (and I currently 
believe that is the better understanding of the issue).  Eichensehr 
offers an excellent discussion of this issue in her piece, though ISIS 
did not emerge until after her piece was published, and so her focus 
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III. ADHERENCE TREASON AS A SPECIES OF COMPLICITY? 
 
This “intent to betray” doctrine that I have discussed is 
now well-established.  It has been repeated in the Supreme 
Court, repeated by other courts, and repeated in the literature 
on treason.  More than anything, as I have explained, that is 
the principle that would foreclose treason liability for Edward 
Snowden.  And yet, established though it is, the derivation of 
this notion remains unclear.   
I asked earlier whether the text really does contain a 
mens rea element.  It does not, after all, do so in the 
conventional way.  There is no familiar, common law mens rea 
term (no “intentionally,” or “willfully,” for example), and 
especially no language common to the notion of specific intent 
(such as “with the intent to . . .”).  But it is nearly impossible to 
imagine treason as a strict liability offense and it has never 
been understood that way in American law.  The federal 
criminal law of mens rea has been inconsistent about its 
rationales for requiring mens rea where it is not codified in the 
statute.117  There is no federal common law of crimes (all 
federal criminal law is statutory) and federal courts have been 
reluctant at times to force common law notions onto 
congressional legislation or federal criminal law doctrine.118  
Still, federal criminal law has developed the following 
principle: absent evidence that Congress intended something 
to the contrary, and unless the offense falls into a category of 
public welfare regulations that would permit strict liability, 
courts presume Congress meant for some mens rea to apply to 
federal crimes.119  This is particularly true, the Court has said, 
                                                                                                       
is on other non-state actors.  See Eichensehr, supra note 10, at 1491-98, 
1505. 
117 Compare Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) with 
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. 
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).  See also United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (describing the Court’s approach to 
mens rea in federal cases where mens rea terms are missing from 
statute). 
118 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). 
119 See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252-53.  See also Staples v. United States, 
511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (stating the preference for requiring mens 
rea, and that congress must clearly intend for a criminal statute to 
dispense with mens rea). 
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where the crime is one against the state (like treason), the 
person, property, or public morals.120  So even in the absence 
of an explicit mens rea element, our natural inclination would 
be to interpret the Treason Clause to impose one.  There is no 
sound reason, then, to doubt Cramer’s explication (or that of 
earlier cases from lower courts) of the law of treason as 
requiring a culpable mental state.   
Cramer, though, understands the word “adhering” as 
necessarily embracing the mental element of intentional 
betrayal.  “Adherence to the enemy,” Justice Jackson said, is 
the “disloyal state of mind” that the Government must 
prove.121  This, presumably, is because one cannot adhere to the 
enemy by anything less than a conscious object to do so.  The 
modern dictionary definition of adhere recognizes such a 
connection between the adherent and the person who receives 
the adherence, as to “give support or maintain loyalty.”122  
And Samuel Johnson’s dictionary of 1755 defined adhere 
primarily as “sticking to,” or “holding together,” but also as 
“[t]o remain firmly fixed to a party, person, or opinion.”123  
There is, therefore, support in English usage for the Court’s 
understanding of the mental state that accompanies one’s 
adherence to the enemy.  Of course, one could argue that 
Cramer and Kawakita make too much of the specific intent to 
betray as a corollary of “adhering,” and that treason could be 
found with something less than specific intent to betray 
America.  For example, one might argue that the constitutional 
text stipulates only that one “adheres” to the enemy when he 
aids and comforts them.  Therefore, the argument goes, so 
long as he actually gives aid and comfort, it matters not 
whether he intends specifically to betray the United States or 
simply desires some firm connection to a different group or 
idea, nor would it matter whether he gives aid and comfort 
only knowingly (in the sense that he is aware that is aiding an 
enemy of the United States), or even recklessly (in the sense 
                                                 
120 Morrissette, 342 U.S. at 252-53. 
121 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 30. 
122 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 14 (10th ed. 2002). 
123 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF 
THE 1755 CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON 81 (1755) (Brandi Besalke, ed.), 
available at 
http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?page_id=7070&i=81. 
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that he is subjectively at fault for consciously choosing a 
course of conduct in which there is a substantial risk that he 
will aid and comfort the enemy).  In any of these scenarios, so 
long as he remains fixed to an enemy in some way, he is by 
definition adhering to the enemy and has committed treason 
as the Constitution describes it.  In this way, the law of treason 
still resists strict liability and maintains some substantial mens 
rea to accompany the relevant overt act, but is not what we 
would think of as a specific intent crime.  If we do not accept 
“adhering” as necessarily requiring the specific intent to 
betray, then this reading of the Treason Clause seems 
plausible. 
Hurst’s work on treason also reached the conclusion 
that a specific intent to betray is an element of treason, and 
cites early cases rejecting guilt for treason based on a lack of 
intent to betray, yet even Hurst acknowledges authority to the 
contrary.124  Hurst alludes only briefly to the disagreement in a 
footnote that compares the law of treason to the law of 
attempt, which requires the specific intent to carry out the 
target crime.125    Hurst is correct that this is the general 
approach to attempt mens rea.  But, for one thing, federal 
criminal law contains no general attempt statute, so there is no 
congressional enactment to which we can look to draw the 
comparison.  Also, Hurst appears to be describing Levying 
War Treason, not Adherence Treason.126  It is true that the 
specific intent would be the same for criminal liability under 
either theory, but because he discusses that specific intent as 
deriving from the natural betrayal of allegiance that would 
exist when levying war against one’s country, he does not 
consider, as Cramer does, whether the specific intent to betray 
constitutes a natural reading of the word “adhering.”127  
Indeed, he concedes that Cramer is ambiguous about the 
specific intent.128  Finally, if Hurst was looking for a criminal 
law analogue to bolster the requirement of a specific intent, 
attempt seems to be the wrong analogue to Adherence 
Treason because the giving of aid and comfort with the 
                                                 
124 See HURST, supra note 12, at 193-203. 
125 Id. 222-23 n.25. 
126 See id. at 193 (discussing “intent” in the context of levying war). 
127 See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 30. 
128 See HURST, supra note 12, at 193, 202. 
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requisite intent would complete the crime, thus taking it out of 
the law of attempts. 
I would suggest still another way of thinking about the 
Treason Clause, and why it requires this kind of “intent,” or 
purpose (or, as discussed previously, motive) to betray.  
Treason has been described as an “outlier” in criminal law, at 
least in the sense that it does not retain the structure of 
modern criminal law.129  If that is true, then there is little 
reason to think it should employ the general parts of crime 
(actus reus, mens rea, causation) in the ways that modern 
criminal law would.  And yet, if we consider the constitutional 
text closely, we see that Adherence Treason (as opposed to 
Levying War Treason) bears much resemblance to the law of 
complicity, and particularly the law of accomplice liability.  
This is not to say that one can be an accomplice to treason or 
that treason prosecutions can be based upon a theory of 
derivative liability.  At common law, which applied the law of 
parties – now overwhelmingly abolished in American criminal 
law, but with which the Framers would have been familiar – 
treason was not among the crimes to which the law of parties 
applied.130  Blackstone, in fact, reminds us that all who commit 
treason are principals.131  Of course, that would be functionally 
true under existing federal criminal law as well, as it explicitly 
treats aiders and abettors as principals.132  My point, rather, is 
merely to explain that there is symmetry between the law of 
Adherence Treason and the law of complicity.   
In our criminal law, we understand that when X aids D 
in the commission of a crime, with the purpose of facilitating 
D’s completion of the crime, then X is guilty of the underlying 
crime on the theory of accomplice liability.133  Modern penal 
codes have worked some variation into this model, but the 
model itself prevails throughout American criminal law.134  Of 
                                                 
129 See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1619. 
130 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, §30.03[A][1], at 460. 
131 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *35. 
132 See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012).  
133 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, §13.2, at 708 (“It may generally be said 
that one is liable as an accomplice to the crime of another if he (a) 
gave assistance or encouragement or failed to perform a legal duty to 
prevent it (b) with the intent thereby to promote or facilitate 
commission of the crime.”). 
134 See id. §13.1(e), at 706-07.   
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course, the mental state required for accomplice liability is a 
subject of considerable debate,135 and I do not purport to 
answer here the many questions that this debate raises.  
Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that a consistent theme of 
the prevailing legal model is that, to be guilty as an 
accomplice, the one providing aid must provide it with the 
purpose of facilitating or promoting or encouraging the 
commission of the target offense, as well as with the mental 
state required by the target offense.136  These are the so-called 
dual intents of accomplice liability.137   
This is true under existing federal law, as well.  Federal 
accomplice liability is governed by statute, section 2 of Title 18, 
which provides that “[w]hoever commits an offense against 
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, 
or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”138  
Although the federal law of accomplice mens rea has been 
uneven, it has been generally agreed that the defendant must 
“intend” that the target crime be committed (though, again, 
there is considerable dispute about what “intent” means in 
this context – whether it requires the purpose that the target 
crime be committed, or simply knowledge that the assistance 
will aid the commission of the target crime).139  In Judge 
Hand’s words, the aider and abettor must have “associated 
himself with the venture, participated in it as in something he 
wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to make it 
succeed.”140  The Supreme Court, in fact, recently reaffirmed 
                                                 
135 Id. §13.2(b), at 712-13.  See also Baruch Weiss, What Were They 
Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer 
Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2002) (analyzing 
federal case law); John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for 
Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 237 
(2008) (analyzing various state law approaches); Grace Mueller, 
Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2169, 
2172 (1988) (discussing various theories). 
136 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, § 30.05, at 469-70. 
137 Id. at 469. 
138 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012). 
139 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 13.2(b)-(d), at 712-18. 
140 United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir. 1938).  The Peoni 
decision has been subject to question.  See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, 
Reading Rosemond, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 233, 239 n.23 (2014); Weiss, 
supra note 135, at 1424.  
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this standard and its kinship to the common law of accomplice 
liability.141  Moreover, even under the law of accomplice 
liability, knowledge does not foreclose a finding of intent.  
Courts can sometimes infer intent from knowledge.142  And to 
complicate matters further, there is authority, in federal 
criminal law as well, for the proposition that accomplice 
liability can be found where the accomplice simply has 
knowledge that her aid will facilitate a crime.143  Again, 
though, the point is not to resolve the debate over mens rea of 
federal accomplice liability.  The point, rather, is that because 
the constitutional text speaks in terms of “aiding” another (the 
enemy), there is a natural relationship between the Treason 
Clause and the law of accomplice liability, the law of aiding 
another.  Understanding Adherence Treason as a species of 
complicity – or at least as a close cousin – may help improve 
our understanding of the Treason Clause and how it functions 
in the modern world of criminal law.   
Both Cramer and Kawakita, in fact, use language that 
only amplifies the sounds of complicity doctrine that 
accompany the Treason Clause.   In Cramer, the Court speaks 
in terms that remind us of the dual intents.144  And although 
Hurst criticized the Cramer Court’s conclusion that the 
                                                 
141 See Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014).  This is not 
to say that Rosemond definitively answers problems related to the 
mens rea of accomplice liability.  See Garvey, supra note 140, at 238-
50. 
142 A well-known case on this subject (though it appears in the 
conspiracy context) is People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1967), in which the operator of telephone answering 
service permitted participants in a prostitution ring to use his 
service, knowing that the service was used for this purpose.  The 
court explained the circumstances under which intent may be 
inferred from knowledge, id. at 478-81, but that none of those 
circumstances existed in Lauria’s case because he had no special 
interest or stake in the success of the prostitution venture.  Id. at 482-
83. 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, modified, 777 F.2d 
345 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Campisi, 306 F.2d 308 (2nd Cir. 
1962).  See also Weiss, supra note 135, at 1396-1409 (analyzing federal 
case law on knowledge). 
144 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 31. 
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treasonous overt act must actually aid the enemy,145 that 
particular reading of the Treason Clause – whatever the other 
shortcomings of the Cramer opinion – would at least be 
consistent with the common law understanding of aid for 
accomplice liability, which required that the accomplice’s aid 
in fact assist the principal.146  Moreover, in Kawakita, the Court 
explained that Adherence Treason does not require that the 
overt act be one that turns the tide in the enemy’s efforts, or 
even that it be one of great significance to the enemy.147  The 
overt act can be insubstantial and have little or no ultimate 
effect on the war effort against the United States.148  So long as 
the aid that the traitor provides would, at a minimum, 
embolden the enemy in its efforts, the aid is sufficient for 
treason (when joined with the relevant treasonous intent).149  
A parallel principle exists in the law of accomplice liability.  
The aid need not be significant.150  Rather, even trivial 
assistance or even mere psychological encouragement, 
combined with the relevant specific intent, is sufficient for 
guilt on a theory of accomplice liability.151  
The Snowden affair offers an example of how this 
principle functions.  Because of the scope of the information 
that he disclosed, and the likelihood that this information 
reached an American enemy (ISIS, al Qaeda, etc.), it is 
certainly plausible to think that the disclosure aided them.152  
                                                 
145 See HURST, supra note 12, at 210.  See also Crane, supra note 13, at 
654-56 (surveying scholarly criticism of Justice Jackson’s Cramer 
opinion). 
146 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, § 30.04[B][1], at 467. 
147 See Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 738. 
148 Id.  The Court also cited Haupt, saying that “harboring the spy in 
Haupt v. United States . . . was also insignificant in the total war effort 
of Germany during the recent war.  Yet it was a treasonable act.”  Id. 
149 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 13.2(a), at 708-09 (describing how 
encouragement may allow guilt on accomplice liability theory). 
150 See United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1996).   
151 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, § 30.04[B][1], at 467.  The law of trivial 
assistance has come under fire.  See Joshua Dressler, Reforming 
Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 427 (2008). 
152 See James Gordon Meek, et al., Intel Heads: Edward Snowden Did 
‘Profound Damage’ to U.S. Security, ABC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2014), available 
at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/intel-heads-edward-snowden-
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Even if the disclosure did not directly result in any American 
casualties, or even have any significant role in an enemy 
attack, the disclosures at least could have emboldened the 
enemy or strengthened the enemy’s fortitude in planning or 
perhaps even executing an attack.  And yet, again, in the 
absence of an intent that the enemy launch a successful attack, 
the aid that the disclosures provided would not be treasonous 
aid and comfort.  The Snowden example, in fact, shows how 
the overlap of treason law with complicity law would resolve 
the knowledge/purpose debate.  That is, even if Snowden was 
aware (had knowledge) that his actions would aid the enemy 
(and this is a fair bet), he still would not be guilty of treason 
because he lacked the specific purpose to betray.   
But think about a different example.  Imagine an 
American citizen who decides to join the cause of, for instance, 
al Qaeda or ISIS.  He or she then communicates information 
digitally – such as via YouTube, Twitter, email, or posted on a 
personal blog – so that the enemy could have easy access to it, 
indeed, with the hope that the enemy would gain access to it 
for purposes of planning an attack or doing some harm to 
America or its security interests.  This could be sensitive 
national security information to which the person has access 
(like the information Snowden disclosed), or it could be other 
information that may benefit those enemy groups in planning 
or executing an attack.  It could even be information pledging 
support for the terrorist cause and a hope for the killing of 
Americans, or the destruction of the United States.  If the 
enemy never sees or receives the communication, then even 
though the citizen intended to betray America, a treason 
prosecution is likely barred.  It offered no aid.  As in the 
common law of accomplice liability, attempted aid is 
insufficient for proving guilt, unless the attempted aid is 
known to the principal actor and thus serves as 
encouragement.153  The overt act must actually offer some aid 
and comfort.   
The Constitution does not mandate significant aid and 
comfort, however.  So if the enemy receives and sees or hears 
                                                                                                       
profound-damage-us-security/story?id=22285388 (describing views 
of James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,  and John 
Brennan, CIA Director). 
153 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, §13.2(a), at 712. 
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the communication, and even if the information merely 
encourages them or bolsters their fortitude to harm America 
or is otherwise only minimally helpful to their cause, this is 
arguably treasonous (assuming, of course, satisfaction of the 
constitutional proof requirements).154  The same could be said 
of Americans who have taken affirmative steps to not only 
indicate their support for ISIS, but to personally, and more 
directly, assist ISIS.155  Even if those citizens never actually 
reached a destination in which they would fight alongside 
other ISIS cohorts, the key question is whether the steps they 
have taken to join ISIS fighters would encourage ISIS in its 
mission.  These are somewhat closer cases, at least where the 
person has not actually reached the point of actual fighting or 
other direct aid beyond expressions of support or 
encouragement for the terrorists.  Material support for 
terrorism (or conspiracy to provide it, or attempt to provide it) 
offers a clearer legal basis for prosecution,156 and indeed, that 
has been the charge of choice for federal prosecutors in those 
cases.157  But many of the acts that constitute material support 
                                                 
154 See Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 738.  See also Bollman,  8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 
126 (“[i]f war actually be levied, . . . all those who perform any part, 
however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and 
who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be 
considered as traitors.”). 
155 See, e.g., More young Americans arrested for joining ISIS, AOL (Mar. 
4, 2015, 11:10 PM), http://www.aol.com/article/2015/03/04/more-
young-americans-arrested-for-joining-isis/21149844/ (noting 
comments by James Clapper that about 180 Americans have traveled 
to Syria to fight alongside ISIS); Elizabeth Whitman, Americans 
Joining ISIS: Arrests Suggest Young Muslims Lured by Social Media, 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015, 3:22 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/americans-joining-isis-arrests-suggest-
young-muslims-lured-social-media-1828286 (noting various citizens 
or American residents who have tried to join ISIS); How many 
Americans have joined ISIS?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 22, 2014, 2:09 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-many-americans-have-
joined-isis/. 
156 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012). 
157 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Philadelphia Woman 
Arrested for Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL (Apr. 3, 
2015); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Madison, Wisconsin Man 
Charged with Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL (Apr. 
9, 2015); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fourth Brooklyn, New 
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would also likely constitute “aid and comfort” for purposes of 
Adherence Treason.158  So prosecutors should not rule out the 
possibility of treason, based on the complicity theory 
articulated here.159  Notice, though, how these scenarios differ 
significantly from the Snowden affair – they, unlike the 
Snowden affair, couple assistance (and an intent to render the 
assistance) with an intent to betray. 
Though the parallels are there, the Court – in its few 
treason cases – has not discussed the law of Adherence 
Treason in these accomplice liability terms.  And the parallels 
are admittedly imperfect, chiefly because we do not prosecute 
Adherence Treason on a theory of complicity.  Accomplice 
liability is derivative, and treason liability is always direct.  
Adherence, with the provision of aid and comfort, is the crime.   
Nonetheless, we see that there are important parallels between 
Adherence Treason and complicity law – especially the law of 
accomplice liability, an older version of which the Framers 
would have known – that may explain the outcomes in both 
Cramer and Kawakita and help us better approach future 
problems involving the nature of one’s aid to the enemy and 
the mental state that must accompany that aid.  This is 
especially true at time when, thanks to digital technology 
accessible anywhere in the world, aiding or encouraging the 
enemy can be easy, instantaneous, and potentially quite 




Whatever else Edward Snowden is guilty of, he is most 
likely not guilty of treason.  That does not mean that we, and 
our political leaders with us, should not condemn his conduct.  
Rather, it simply means that we should endeavor to be more 
accurate in our use of treason as serious political rhetoric and 
more conscientious about developing a complete – or, as 
                                                                                                       
York Resident Charged with Attempt and Conspiracy to Provide 
Material Support to ISIL (Apr. 6, 2015). 
158 See 18 U.S.C. §2339A(b) (2012) (broadly defining “material 
support”).   
159 Cf. Eichensehr, supra note 10, at 1503-05 (arguing that, in 
balancing advantages and disadvantages of treason prosecutions for 
assisting non-state actors, often the benefits will outweigh the risks). 
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complete as can be expected, given the complexity and nature 
of it – understanding of American treason law.  American 
treason is supposed to be hard to prove, hard to prosecute, 
and hard to punish.  Yet where it exists, as the Constitution 
defines it, federal prosecutors should be more ready to enforce 
it and to seek severe punishment for it.  Modern technology 
and social media, and the demonstrated willingness of some 
Americans to join forces with modern terrorists, could make 
treason prosecutions more plausible than they have been in 
American history.  As the Snowden affair reveals, however, 
treason against the United States requires that only with the 
confluence of a sufficiently guilty act and guilty mind devoted 
to betraying America will a treason prosecution represent a 
constitutionally acceptable legal response to conduct that 
harms American national security and the institutions of 
American government.   Merely doing harm to American 
interests may be criminal, but it is not necessarily treasonous.  
This might make us inclined to broaden American treason, for 
broadening treason law might make it easier for us to allege 
and prove treason with respect to Americans who do harm to 
American institutions and interests by aiding our enemies.  
And it might make us feel better about having a criminal law 
that comports with our rhetorical and psychological 
sensibilities about disloyalty.  But doing so would be 
inconsistent with the narrow and limited version of treason 
that the founding generation – which well understood the 
politics and consequences of disloyalty – not only desired, but 
provided in the constitutional text.  Weakening the limits on 
American treason could undermine the delicate balance that 
the Constitution has struck to ensure sober use of the federal 




















“Secrets, silent, stony sit in the dark palaces of both our hearts: 





I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Human beings are curious by nature.  We love to ask 
the “why” questions and would rather be privy to a secret 
than be kept in the dark.  Not surprisingly, government 
conspiracy theories are quite popular.1  It is much more 
                                                 
*Associate Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan 
School of Law. I would like to thank Lauren Mullins for her 
invaluable research assistance, enthusiasm, thoughts and critiques 
on this topic. 
1 JFK (Warner Bros. 1991) (US Gross Box Office = $70,405,498) 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0102138/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus; 
CONSPIRACY THEORY (Warner Bros. 1997) (US Gross Box Office = 
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interesting to think part of the government was somehow 
involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy 
rather than believe the lone gunman theory, or that the 
government is covering up an alien invasion by storing UFOs 
and alien bodies at Area 51 in Roswell rather than believe no 
such thing exists.2 
Thus, when Edward Snowden revealed that one of the 
government’s most secretive agencies, the National Security 
Agency (“NSA”), previously nicknamed “No Such Agency,” 
was keeping a huge secret from the American people and 
monitoring American citizens’ phone calls, instant messaging, 
emails, documents kept in the “cloud,” contact lists, 
metadata,3 GPS data, etc., this became one of the greatest 
government conspiracy theories to contemplate since JFK and 
Roswell.   
Is the NSA listening to my phone call right now?  What 
if I say the word “president” or “al Qaeda,” would they 
definitely be listening then?  Or what if I “Google” one of 
these words?  Would the NSA instantly watch what websites I 
am viewing? 
Of course, it would be extremely difficult to keep such 
a large-scale government conspiracy under wraps.  It seems 
                                                                                                       
$76,081,498) 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118883/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus.  
2 Journalist Annie Jacobsen surmised that the UFOs and aliens found 
in Roswell, Nevada in 1947 were actually Russian children around 
12-years-old with large heads and abnormally shaped, over-sized 
eyes that were the genetic experiments of Josef Mengele, a former 
German Nazi officer and physician in Auschwitz.  ANNIE JACOBSEN, 
AREA 51: AN UNCENSORED HISTORY OF AMERICA’S TOP SECRET 
MILITARY BASE 2011.  Soviet leader Joseph Stalin wanted to cause 
hysteria in America with the thought of “UFOs and an alien 
invasion.”  Id.   
3 Metadata, or transactional information, is collected as phone calls 
“are handed over, as is location data, call duration, unique 
identifiers, and the time and duration of all calls. The contents of the 
conversation itself are not covered.”  Glenn Greenwald, NSA 
collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, THE 
GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order.  The "business records" provision of the 
PATRIOT Act (50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2014)) has been used as a legal 
justification for bulk collection of domestic telephone records.  Id. 
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surprising that any top-secret classified government operation 
is kept a secret.  Ben Franklin’s famous quote, “[t]hree may 
keep a secret, if two of them are dead,”4 might sound 
melodramatic but it rings true.  Not much is kept secret 
anymore – in fact, there appears to be more and more 
disclosures as spies, whistleblowers, journalists, and insiders 
begin to share their knowledge and spread it throughout the 
internet.  The public clamors it has a need-to-know in order to 
keep the government in check. 
But what is it we need to know?  Do we need to know 
the specifics as to how individual NSA collection programs 
work?  Should the public know which communication 
methods are being intercepted by the NSA and thus 
compromised, or what foreign embassies and consulates are 
being surveilled both inside and outside of the U.S., or how 
electronic beacons are implanted within targeted electronic 
devices, or how the NSA taps into the telecommunications of 
service providers, or know about U.S. collection priorities 
against foreign countries?     
Once the initial reporting on the Snowden leak began 
in June 2013, the media and public wanted to know more – 
what was the NSA collecting, what were they listening to, 
what were they doing with this information, who are they 
sharing this information with?  The actual legalities and 
illegalities of certain NSA programs and collection of data 
became more blurred as the media focused on the wide-scale 
public outrage at the idea that the government was spying on 
its own citizens regardless of the legalities.  The media 
emphasized the public’s ever-increasing distrust of 
government and the intelligence community’s (IC)5 classified 
programs. 
                                                 
4 Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard’s Almanack (1735), available at 
http://www.vlib.us/amdocs/texts/prichard35.html.  A student of 
mine recently informed me this is also the theme to a show entitled, 
“Pretty Little Liars.” 
5 “The Intelligence Community (IC) is a group of Executive Branch 
agencies and organizations that work separately and together to 
engage in intelligence activities that are necessary for the conduct of 
foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the 
United States.” OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, U.S. 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: AN OVERVIEW 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.
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Now that the initial deluge of classified information 
from Snowden’s leaks has been disclosed, the questions are 
two-fold: (1) are these expansive collection programs by the IC 
legal or illegal and (2) if legal, are these “whistleblower” 
disclosures justified given the resultant damage these leaks 
have caused to our national security and law enforcement’s 
ability to prevent the commission of future crimes? 
 
II. LEGALITY OF IC’S ACTIONS 
 
What is difficult to determine from the recent media 
disclosures is what exactly is being collected, how is the 
information collected, at what point can communications be 
accessed and analyzed, who receives the analysis, and what is 
the legal justification for each step along this process. There is 
a significant distinction between authorizations to collect 
telephone caller identification record information, or “to” and 
“from” information on a particular email address, versus 
authorization to listen in on the content of such 
communications. If this distinction is not made clear, then the 
public can draw erroneous conclusions about alleged breaches 
of privacy based upon misinformation. 
 
A. NSA’S BULK COLLECTION OF METADATA: SECTION 215 
 
Snowden disclosed that the NSA is collecting the 
metadata from millions and even billions of phone calls and 
emails sent out every day, including Americans’ emails and 
                                                                                                       
pdf.   Sixteen United States intelligence agencies comprise the IC and 
are under the Office of the Director of the National Intelligence: the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) National Security Branch, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) Office of National Security Intelligence, 
Department of Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counter-
intelligence, State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department 
of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and Army, 
Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Naval Intelligence. See id. 
at 9. 
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phone calls.6  Metadata includes “much of the information that 
appears on a customer’s telephone bill: the date and time of a 
call, its duration, and the participating telephone numbers” 
and can include the nature of “how the call was routed from 
one participant to the other through the infrastructure of the 
telephone companies’ networks.”7  
The NSA was given this power when the PATRIOT 
Act was passed post-9/11.8  Section 215 of the Act allows the 
government to obtain a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC or FISA court) order every ninety days requiring 
third parties (including telecommunications providers) to 
hand over any records or other “tangible thing” if deemed 
“relevant” to “any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence 
information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”9   
The NSA utilized this “Access to Certain Business 
Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism 
Investigations” power to justify their bulk telephone records 
collection program.10 The NSA began to collect metadata from 
all sorts of third parties, including telecommunications carriers 
and internet providers, in order to have the information close 
                                                 
6 GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE 
NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 30-32 (2014). 
7 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT 
ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED 
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT 8, 21 (Jan. 23, 2014) [hereinafter PCLOB 
TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT], available at 
http://www.pclob.gov/library/215-
Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf.    
8 Id.  
9 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT 
Act) Act of 2001, sec 208(1), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
[hereinafter PATRIOT Act] (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf., at sec. 215.  See also BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUSTICE, ARE THEY ALLOWED TO DO THAT? A 
BREAKDOWN OF SELECTED GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 1 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Gover
nment%20Surveillance%20Factsheet.pdf.     
10 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.  
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at hand when it came time to conduct a targeted search.11 The 
NSA stores these collected telephone records in a centralized 
database.12 Before an analyst can access the database and 
search for a specific number or selection term, “one of twenty-
two designated NSA officials must first determine there is a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the number is associated 
with terrorism.”13 Once the analyst gains approval, he or she 
“may run queries that will return the calling records for that 
seed [number], and permit ‘contact chaining’ to develop a 
fuller picture of the seed’s contacts. Contact chaining enables 
analysts to retrieve not only the numbers directly in contact 
with the seed number (“the first hop”), but also numbers in 
contact with all first hop numbers (the “second hop”), as well 
as all numbers in contact with all second hop numbers (the 
“third hop”).”14 
The government’s argument is that one cannot 
investigate and prevent terrorist attacks without real-time 
access to metadata to determine who is contacting whom and 
when.  “When the NSA identifies communications that may be 
associated with terrorism, it issues intelligence reports to other 
federal agencies, such as the FBI, that work to prevent terrorist 
attacks.”15 It is difficult to predict when attacks may occur, 
even more so if one hand is tied behind the IC’s back when not 
given the ability to follow a target’s phone number trail 
wherever that might lead. 
Critics of section 215 argue that by permitting 
intelligence agencies, specifically the NSA, to collect metadata 
from a variety of third parties, section 215 allows the 
government to get a whole picture of a person by searching 
one’s “financial, library, travel, video rental, phone, medical, 
church, synagogue, and mosque records . . . providing the 
government says it’s trying to protect against terrorism.”16  
                                                 
11 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 1-2. 
12 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 8. 
13 Id. at 8-9. 
14 Id. at 9. 
15 Id. at 8. 
16 Emma Roller, This Is What Section 215 of the Patriot Act Does, SLATE 
(June 7, 2013, 1:17 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/06/07/nsa_prism_scan
dal_what_patriot_act_section_215_does.html.  
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Metadata, “if properly exploited, could yield more valuable 
information than recordings of the phone calls or email 
messages themselves.”17   
Critics further argue that “[i]t is difficult to believe that 
the phone records of millions of Americans are actually 
‘relevant’ to a specific terrorist or foreign intelligence 
investigation. Nor does Section 215 appear to allow the 
government to collect first and determine relevance later, 
which is what the government claims it is doing.”18   
In January 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board (PCLOB)19 issued a report after reviewing the 
NSA’s bulk collection of phone records.  The PCLOB found 
the bulk collection of phone records failed to comply with 
Section 215 and therefore should be terminated or significantly 
revised.20  The PCLOB determined (1) the bulk telephone 
records acquired had “no connection to any specific FBI 
investigation at the time of their collection;” (2) since the 
records are collected in bulk, they are not “relevant” to a 
particular investigation as required under section 215; (3) 
requiring telephone companies to furnish new call records on 
a daily basis is not permitted under section 215 nor FISA; and 
(4) section 215 only permits the FBI and not the NSA to obtain 
records relevant to a terrorism or foreign intelligence 
investigation.21  
That same month, President Obama made his own 
comments regarding the section 215 program, stating he 
would continue to allow government use of bulk phone 
records while they attempt to come up with an alternative 
                                                 
17 SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S 
SURVEILLANCE STATE 204-05 (Penguin Books, 2011). 
18 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 3. 
19 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was 
established in 2004 by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.  In 2007, the 9/11 Commission Act 
restructured the Board requiring that all five members be appointed 
by the President.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)(e) (2012 & Supp. 2014).  
As a result, the Board did not fully exist until June 2013, after the 
Senate confirmed members to resume operations.  PRIVACY AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://www.pclob.gov/about-us 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2014).  
20 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 10. 
21 Id. 
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solution “without the government holding this metadata 
itself” and would require the agency to get court approval 
prior to accessing the metadata.22  The NSA would also no 
longer be able to access records that go beyond two persons 
removed from the original query.23 
In response to these findings, in May 2014, the House 
passed the USA Freedom Act24 which focuses on the NSA’s 
call-records program in which the agency retains billions of 
records for all phone calls made from or to the United States. 
Under the legislation, telecommunications companies would 
retain those records, and the NSA would only have access to 
specific information about targeted individuals under court 
orders.25 A year later, due to inaction by the Senate, the bulk 
collection program under section 215 was allowed to expire on 
June 1, 2015.26 The Senate then approved the USA Freedom 
                                                 
22 Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 Speech on NSA Reforms, 





24 USA Freedom Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), available at 
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3361.  
25 Id. The bill “[r]equires the FBI to include in such tangible thing 
applications a specific selection term to be used as the basis for such 
production.” Id. A “specific selection term” is “a term specifically 
identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device” that is 
“used by the government to limit the scope of the information or 
tangible things sought pursuant to the statute.” Id. In each 
application requesting call detail records (i.e., telephone numbers 
and time or duration of a call), the FBI must show “(1) reasonable 
grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to be produced 
based on the specific selection term are relevant to such 
investigation; and (2) facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that such specific selection term is associated with a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” Id.  
26 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June 
29, 2015 at 2. See also Erin Kelly, Here’s what happens now that the 
Patriot Act Provisions Expired, USA Today, June 1, 2015, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/31/patrio
t-act-expires-senate-stalemate/28260905/. 
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Act on June 2nd, and the revised Section 215 program which 
effectively eliminates bulk collection will continue until 
December 15, 2019.27 The USA Freedom Act allows the bulk 
collection of telephone metadata for only a 180 day transition 
period (until November 29, 2015) during which such collection 
could continue.28 
 
B. NSA’S MONITORING OF CONVERSATIONS: FISA AND 
SECTION 702 
 
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act addresses the bulk 
collection of telephone records, and the FISA Amendments of 
2008 (FAA) address the collection and subsequent analysis of 
the content of telephone and internet communications.29 The 
FAA (also known as section 702) has been utilized to allow the 
NSA to work with electronic communication service providers 
“to copy, scan, and filter internet and phone traffic coming 
through their physical infrastructure” and compel the 
disclosure of the content of such communications so long as it 
targets foreign persons reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States.30  No particular warrant is required 
in that instance. The targeting of the non-U.S. person on 
foreign soil must be conducted in order to acquire foreign 
                                                 
27 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June 
29, 2015 at 2-3 (citing to USA FREEDOM Act § 705(a)). 
28 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June 
29, 2015 at 10-11 (citing to section 109(a) of the USA FREEDOM Act). 
29 H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. (2007-2008), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304enr/pdf/BILLS-
110hr6304enr.pdf. 
30 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION REGARDING SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AMENDMENTS ACT TO THE PRIVACY AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD 8 (Apr. 22, 2014), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/04/22/eff_pclob_comments_11_ap
ril_2014.pdf; See also H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. (2007-2008), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304enr/pdf/BILLS-
110hr6304enr.pdf. 
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intelligence information as defined in FISA, and the NSA must 
obtain approval from the FISA court as to their targeting and 
minimization procedures prior to collection to make sure U.S. 
persons are not inadvertently intercepted.31  
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to separate the 
collection of phone and internet communications of strictly 
foreign persons from U.S. persons if the foreign person is 
communicating with a U.S. person.32  These communications 
are also potentially being copied and stored in a searchable 
database.33 Information on U.S. persons may incidentally be 
collected if that U.S. person communicates with a non-U.S. 
person that is being targeted or two non-U.S. persons discuss 
the U.S. person.34 Or, a U.S. person’s conversation may 
inadvertently be collected by mistake if erroneously targeted 
by the NSA and thought to be a non-U.S. person.35 In the case 
of inadvertent collection, the communications must be 
destroyed.36 
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB) approved of the Section 702 program in its report 
dated July 2, 2014, stating:  
                                                 
31 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 6 (July 2, 2014) [hereinafter 
PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT], available at 
https://www.nsa.gov/civil_liberties/_files/pclob_section_702_repo
rt.pdf.  “The targeting procedures govern how the executive branch 
determines that a particular person is reasonably believed to be a 
non-U.S. person located outside the United States, and that targeting 
this person will lead to the acquisition of foreign intelligence 
information. The minimization procedures cover the acquisition, 
retention, use, and dissemination of any non-publicly available U.S. 
person information acquired through the Section 702 program.” Id. 
at 6-7. “For example, the NSA’s minimization procedures require 
that queries of Section 702-acquired information be designed so that 
they are ‘reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence 
information.’” Id. at 8. 
32 JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA 
FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 304 (Anchor Books, 
2009). 
33 Id.  
34 PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 28, at 6. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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[t]he Section 702 program has enabled the 
government to acquire a greater range of 
foreign intelligence than it otherwise would 
have been able to obtain – and to do so quickly 
and effectively.  Compared with the 
“traditional” FISA process under Title I of the 
statute, Section 702 imposes significantly fewer 
limits on the government . . . [t]he program has 
proven valuable in the government’s efforts to 
combat terrorism as well as in other areas of 
foreign intelligence. . . . [m]onitoring terrorist 
networks under Section 702 has enabled the 
government to learn how they operate, and to 
understand their priorities, strategies, and 
tactics.37   
 
While the core of the section 702 program was deemed 
to be “reasonable” under Fourth Amendment law, the PCLOB 
set forth additional proposals to address their concerns about 
 
the unknown and potentially large scope of the 
incidental collection of U.S. persons’ 
communications, the use of “about” collection 
to acquire Internet communications that are 
neither to nor from the target of surveillance, 
and the use of queries to search for the 
communications of specific U.S. persons within 
the information that has been collected.38  
 
On June 19, 2014, the House passed a bill that includes 
an amendment which bars the NSA, the CIA, and others in the 
IC from actually examining the communications of Americans 
that were collected into databases created to target 
foreigners.39  Critics have called this technique the “backdoor 
                                                 
37 Id. at 9-10.   
38 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. 
39 H.R. 5016, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), available at 
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
bill/5016/amendments.  
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search loophole.”40  “The bill also prohibits the government 
from requiring a private company to alter its software to allow 
clandestine surveillance.”41  
 
C. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AS TO IC ACTIONS 
 
In summary, upon review of FISA, the FAA, and the 
PATRIOT Act, it would be lawful for the NSA to monitor 
electronic communications of foreign persons reasonably 
believed42 to be located overseas without any type of warrant.  
However, if that person is a “U.S. person” or that foreign 
person was to communicate with a person located in the 
United States, the NSA would need to apply for a FISA 
warrant.  The difficulty is in determining where the particular 
person is located at the time of the call.  While the law does 
not allow the intentional monitoring of U.S. persons, the FISC 
approves minimization procedures to limit the amount of 
information about U.S. persons that is intercepted, retained, 
and disseminated.  Hence, the IC’s monitoring of content in 
communications is legal. 
On the other hand, the legality of the NSA’s collection 
of metadata is uncertain. While the NSA had previously used 
section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to justify its bulk records 
                                                 
40 Charlie Savage, House Votes to Curb N.S.A. Scrutiny of Americans’ 
Communications, NY TIMES (June 20, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/us/politics/house-votes-to-
curb-nsa-scrutiny-of-americans-communications.html.   
41 Andrew Rosenthal, The House Actually Did Something About 
Warrantless Surveillance, TAKING NOTE: THE EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR’S 
BLOG (June 20, 2014, 1:30 PM), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/the-house-
actually-did-something-about-warrantless-surveillance/.   
42 “[T]he NSA has reportedly interpreted that to mean that it need 
only ensure ’51 percent confidence of the target’s ‘foreignness.’”  
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 3;  See also Barton 
Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British intelligence mining data from 
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collection program,43 it is now clear that the NSA has been 
collecting more than foreign persons’ metadata and metadata 
not necessarily relevant to a terrorism or foreign intelligence 
investigation.44  Regardless, the bulk data collection of 
business records and other tangible things, as we know it, will 
terminate after November 29, 2015.45 After such date, the IC 
will have to furnish “specific selection term[s]” to the FISC 
before being granted access to such metadata from third party 
communications providers.46 However, at the time of the 
Snowden leak, both the monitoring of content and the bulk 
records collection program were legally justified. 
 
III. SNOWDEN’S REASONS FOR DISCLOSURE VERSUS DAMAGE 
DONE TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
A. BULK COLLECTION AND KEEPING THE INTERNET 
“FREE” 
 
Snowden’s real complaint seems to boil down to the 
NSA’s collection of metadata – not the subsequent analysis of 
this data because targeting and minimization procedures have 
been put in place to avoid bulk analysis of the data collected.  
Therefore, Snowden is concerned about the potential for abuse 
in the collection of metadata not necessarily current abuse of 
power now that this data is in the hands of the NSA. 
                                                 
43 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2014). 
44 Barton Gellman et al., In NSA-intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted 




4b1b969b6322_story.html?hpid=z1.   
45 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June 
29, 2015 at 18. 
46 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, 
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June 
29, 2015 at 10 (citing to USA FREEDOM Act § 103(b), amending FISA 
§ 501(c)). 
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Snowden has given several interviews and written 
manifestos explaining why the public needs to know the 
specifics as to what the NSA is collecting and how they are 
collecting it. In Snowden’s eyes, only with the public’s input 
can true regulation and accountability take place.47 
Apparently, congressional oversight committees, the FISC, the 
Department of Justice, internal agency auditing and 
monitoring, and oversight from the Executive branch is not 
enough.  It bears reminding that the previously described 
collection and surveillance programs are regulated – by 
Congress, by the FISC, by the Department of Justice and by 
oversight lawyers within intelligence agencies themselves.48   
Snowden wants to keep the internet free from NSA 
collection – so that those who grow up on the internet feel free 
to explore, make mistakes, and express themselves without 
fear that anyone is watching.49  Unfortunately, regardless of 
whether the NSA is watching, others are and will always be 
watching. Private companies make it their mission to collect as 
much information as possible on individual consumers and 
sell it to the highest commercial bidder. Criminals both 
overseas and in our own back yard who want to steal our 
information are monitoring and exploiting the Internet as well. 
Director of the FBI, James Comey, recently stated,  
                                                 
47 GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 13, 30-31. 
48 At a recent debate, former CIA director James Woolsey stated,  
I have seen, either from in the Executive 
Branch, or as a private citizen interested in 
these issues and following them, the 
oversight personnel capabilities, numbers of 
offices, numbers of people involved in 
overseeing the American system of 
intelligence is truly awesome. There is no 
country anywhere in the world that has the 
massive oversight from legislative, judicial, 
and executive sides and functions over their 
intelligence systems. Nobody is even close 
to the United States. 
Transcript of INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S. debate, Snowden was 
justified, (Feb. 12, 2014), available at 
http://intelligencesquaredus.org/images/debates/past/transcripts
/021214%20Snowden.pdf.   
49 GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 46-47. 
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I think there's something about sitting in front 
of your own computer working on your own 
banking, your own health care, your own social 
life that makes it hard to understand the danger 
(of third party surveillance, cybercrime, and 
cyber-attacks on companies and individuals on 
the internet). I mean, the Internet is the most 
dangerous parking lot imaginable. But if you 
were crossing a mall parking lot late at night, 
your entire sense of danger would be 
heightened. You would stand straight. You'd 
walk quickly. You'd know where you were 
going. You would look for light. Folks are 
wandering around that proverbial parking lot 
of the Internet all day long, without giving it a 
thought to whose attachments they're opening, 
what sites they're visiting. And that makes it 
easy for the bad guys.50 
 
The Internet, unfortunately, will never be free from 
surveillance. Even if our government is not monitoring the 
Internet, there will always be a myriad of bad actors that do.  
Foreign Intelligence Services target the Internet to collect 
positive intelligence and steal trade secrets, cyber criminals 
hack into our private e-mails and steal personal identification 
information, terrorist organizations promote jihad and the 
destruction of our cyber infrastructure.  
More importantly, do we want our government to be 
proactive and attempt to prevent or disrupt terrorist attacks 
before they take place? If the answer is yes, then we need to 
provide federal law enforcement with a requisite amount of 




                                                 
50 Transcript of Interview by Scott Pelley with James Comey, Oct. 5, 
2014, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-director-
james-comey-on-threat-of-isis-cybercrime/. 
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B. BULK COLLECTION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE OF 
POWER 
 
Snowden’s argument for public disclosure would be 
much stronger if he could point to specific abuses of power 
that would liken current NSA activities to those abuses 
disclosed in the 1970’s during the Church Committee hearings. 
The Church Committee discovered that the IC had illegally 
gathered information and compiled files on communists in the 
1950s and civil rights groups and Vietnam War protesters in 
the 1960s.51 These findings resulted in a significant overhaul in 
IC oversight and accountability and the passage of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 in order to prevent 
future abuse of power by the IC.52 
 In addition to his concerns about NSA spying on 
Americans through its bulk collection programs, Snowden 
also disclosed examples of individual government employees 
who abused the power and responsibility placed in their 
hands.  This abuse of power was illegal, and the offenders 
should have faced criminal or severe administrative penalties, 
but their behavior in many instances was either condoned or 
overlooked. In one article, Snowden is quoted as saying,  
 
Many of the people searching through the 
haystacks were young, enlisted guys, 18 to 22 
years old. They’ve suddenly been thrust into a 
position of extraordinary responsibility, where 
they now have access to all your private 
records. In the course of their daily work, they 
stumble across something that is completely 
unrelated in any sort of necessary sense – for 
example, an intimate nude photo of someone in 
a sexually compromising situation. But they’re 
extremely attractive. So what do they do? They 
turn around in their chair and they show a co-
                                                 
51 UNITED STATES SENATE, Senate History: January 27, 1975 Church 
Committee Created, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Church_Co
mmittee_Created.htm.   
52 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 
92 Stat. 1793 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 to 1811 (2014)). 
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worker. And their co-worker says, “Oh, hey, 
that’s great. Send that to Bill down the way,” 
and then Bill sends it to George, George sends it 
to Tom, and sooner or later this person’s whole 
life has been seen by all of these other people. 
The analysts don’t discuss such things in the 
NSA cafeterias, but back in the office anything 
goes, more or less. You’re in a vaulted space. 
Everybody has sort of similar clearances, 
everybody knows everybody. It’s a small 
world. It’s never reported, because the auditing 
of these systems is incredibly weak. The fact 
that records of your intimate moments have 
been taken from your private communication 
stream, from the intended recipient, and given 
to the government, without any specific 
authorisation, without any specific need, is 
itself a violation of your rights. [When asked 
how often do such things happen?] . . . I’d say 
probably every two months. It’s routine 
enough. These are seen as sort of the fringe 
benefits of surveillance positions.53 
 
Everyone would agree that NSA analysts should not be 
opening private email attachments that contain naked photos 
(or any non-foreign intelligence related material for that 
matter) and sending them to their colleagues.  This is illegal 
and there should be repercussions.  But was exposure of 
childish behavior by a few analysts of such significance to 
outweigh the damage done to our nation’s security due to 
Snowden’s disclosures?   
Other reasons why Snowden made such disclosures 
include: (1) disgust over CIA operatives who would get 
targets drunk enough to land in jail and then bail them out in 
order to recruit an asset,54 (2) Clapper lying in a congressional 
                                                 
53 Alan Rusbridger & Ewan Macaskill, I, Spy: Edward Snowden in 
Exile, THE GUARDIAN, July 19, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-
snowden-interview-rusbridger-macaskill.   
54 James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED, Aug. 13, 
2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/.  
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hearing about whether the NSA collects data on Americans,55 
(3) military and CIA drones and targeted killings,56 (4) outrage 
over the NSA’s “ability to map the movement of everyone in a 
city by monitoring their MAC address, a unique identifier 
emitted by every cell phone, computer, and other electronic 
device,”57 (5) NSA’s access to email and other Internet traffic 
from Syria during the civil war,58 (6) the NSA’s building of a 
Massive Data Repository where “billions of phone calls, faxes, 
emails, computer-to-computer data transfers, and text 
messages from around the world [would] flow through the 
MDR every hour,”59 and (7) the NSA’s access to virtually all 
private communications coming in from overseas to people in 
the US in order to “identify these malicious traffic flows and 
respond to them.”60 
Again, the resounding concern is collection, and the 
fact that the public is not told about the mass collection. As 
mentioned, some of Snowden’s complaints had nothing to do 
with bulk collection. Snowden did have a list of individual 
government employees whose actions merited administrative 
action and reprimand, but their specific activity did not 
undermine the legality or wisdom of the programs which 
Snowden was actually railing against. Snowden has certainly 
been successful at opening the dialogue as to bulk collection – 
as everyone is now discussing collection, how to reform or 
eliminate section 215, and how to move collection from 
government’s hands to a third party.61  
                                                 
55 At a congressional hearing on March 12, 2014, Senator Ron Wyden 
asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, “Does the 
NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of 
millions of Americans?” Clapper responded, “No sir . . . not 









61 Would a third party’s (telecommunications company) employees 
perform better than government employees and abuse their power 
much less than government employees that undergo background 
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Transparency is important to a certain degree. It keeps 
the government honest and it ensures the public can keep tabs 
on the checks and balances that are put in place to ensure 
abuse does not occur. But too much transparency defeats the 
very purpose of clandestine intelligence operations in the first 
place, i.e., to protect the American public and keep the bad 
guys in the dark as to our intentions and capabilities.  The 
general public has already been informed as to the purpose 
and mission of the NSA, plus a vague description of NSA 
collection platforms and capabilities is readily available.  Once 
you delve into the details such as specific methods and 
sources, and the identities of certain targets, then this 
information becomes sensitive and classified, and as such, 
should be available to only those who are trusted and have a 
legitimate need to know.  It may be advisable to have an open 
discussion on collection but there is no need to go into details 
that are classified, since such disclosures could cause harm to 
national security.  Whistleblowers certainly need to step 
forward to discuss abuse within the system, especially when 
these failures are not being addressed by oversight committees 
within or outside the IC agencies.  Certainly, on an individual 
level, when government analysts are caught monitoring calls 
and opening attachments that are not relevant to an 
authorized investigation, these people need to be brought to 
the attention of that agency’s internal security team.  However, 
there are multiple administrative layers of authority, policy 
review officials and security personnel available to anyone 
concerned who earnestly wants to report wrong doing or 
illegal activity. 
One concern raised by Snowden is the allegation that 
the NSA “has been gathering records of online sexual activity 
and evidence of visits to pornographic websites as part of a 
proposed plan to harm the reputations of those whom the 
agency believes are radicalizing others [to become devoted to 
the jihadist cause] through incendiary speeches.”62 The six 
                                                                                                       
checks and significant vetting before being granted top secret 
clearances? 
62 Glenn Greenwald, Ryan Grim, & Ryan Gallagher, Top Secret 
Document Reveals NSA Spied on Porn Habits as Part of Plan to Discredit 
‘Radicalizers’, HUFF. POST, Nov. 26, 2013, 
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“radicalizers” known to be targeted by the NSA were Muslim 
and all are believed to be currently residing outside the United 
States though one has been described as a U.S. person.63 
Snowden argued in a recent interview that this type of 
surveillance and individual targeting may easily find its way 
into U.S. politics, and these tactics could be used to spy on the 
pornography-viewing habits of political opponents. 64 
However, there is no evidence to suggest such a giant leap has 
been made, and this type of slippery slope is exactly what 
oversight committees, supervisors, and government lawyers, 
need to monitor, and prevent any subsequent abuse of 
power.65 
The United States Intelligence Community including 
the NSA collects foreign political, economic and military 
intelligence in order to provide U.S. policy makers with the 
necessary information to make the proper decisions in order to 
protect our national security and promote America’s best 
interests both at home and abroad.  To accomplish this goal, 
the IC, within certain legal limits needs to have access to every 
conceivable intelligence collection technique.  The moral and 
ethical use of these tools, the potential benefits and possibility 
for abuse, the advisability and public acceptance for these 
techniques, are questions and discussions best left to the three 
branches of our government, and the public, to a more limited 








64 Bamford, supra note 54. 
65 For example, it was reported that CIA officers searched the 
computers of congressional staff while they prepared a Senate 
Intelligence Committee report on the CIA’s detention and 
interrogation program. The CIA’s inspector general investigated the 
matter and sent a criminal referral to the DOJ for further 
investigation. Mark Mazetti & Carl Hulse, Inquiry by C.I.A. Affirms It 
Spied on Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/01/world/senate-intelligence-
commitee-cia-interrogation-report.html?_r=0. This is exactly what 
needs to be done when abuse of power is suspected. 
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IV. THE DAMAGE DONE 
 
Chairman of the Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies and former Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, 
during a recent debate on whether Snowden was justified, 
described four programs which have been compromised due 
to the disclosures: (1) pre-Snowden, the IC had learned how to 
counter Chinese cyber-attacks by sending their malware back 
to the hackers after making some adjustments and creating 
problems for them; Snowden’s disclosures explained how the 
U.S. was able to do this; (2) pre-Snowden, the IC was able to 
read emails and early stage drafts of emails of the Islamic State 
of Iraq; Snowden’s disclosures allowed the terrorist group to 
learn of this; (3) pre-Snowden, the Defense Department had 
technology that allowed soldiers and CIA operatives to know 
whether they were being followed; post-Snowden, this 
technology has been shared with our adversaries; and (4) pre-
Snowden, the U.S. learned how to penetrate the 
communication networks in some Latin American countries of 
some of the worst organizations and groups that are selling 
women, principally women into sexual slavery; post-Snowden 
those sex trafficking organizations now know which 
communication networks are compromised.66  
Any time a government employee or unauthorized 
person reveals sources and methods used by law enforcement 
or the IC, this disclosure allows criminals, spies, and terrorists 
alike to minimize their risk of getting caught by taking 
countermeasures. When FBI Director Comey reveals that “the 
emergence of default encryption settings and encrypted 
devices and networks” will “leave law enforcement in the 
dark” and then names the specific companies building these 
devices, the concern is that criminals will use these loopholes 
to avoid detection.67 The protection of sources and methods is 
critical to curtail illegal activity. 
                                                 
66 Transcript of INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S. debate, supra note 43. 
67 Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision 
Course? A Conversation with FBI Director James Comey, BROOKINGS 
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Perhaps the exposure of specific programs, sources, 
and methods is not the only problem, since there is now the 
dilemma or revelation of what was not disclosed, what does 
not exist, which indirectly underscores NSA limitations.  In 
other words, if all of NSA’s programs are disclosed, 
theoretically everything that was not revealed does not exist.  
NSA surveillance capabilities would be limited to the 
techniques exposed by Snowden and others.  Criminals and 
terrorists alike have typically displayed signs of paranoia 
believing that IC capabilities approach the levels of those 
depicted in science fiction, and some adversaries are 
concerned that their every move is being watched by law 
enforcement.  And more than likely, our sophisticated 
adversaries assume the government has greater surveillance 
powers than they actually do.  The mystique of “big brother” 
can be a more effective weapon and deterrent than if our 
adversaries actually knew our true capabilities. What these 
disclosures have revealed is that the government has limits to 
what they can target, who they can target, and what they can 
access. As Snowden argues in his own words, “[t]he fact that 
people know communications can be monitored does not stop 
people from communicating [digitally]. Because the only 
choices are to accept the risk, or to not communicate at all.”68 
But at least now, our adversaries know which communication 
service providers cooperate with the government, the specific 
collection techniques being used, and where the IC has 
focused the majority of its efforts.  Our adversaries can now 
develop countermeasures, alternative methods of 
communicating with one another, and avoid or eliminate 
operations with identified vulnerabilities.  NSA’s mystique of 
know-all, see-all has been seriously tarnished.  
Extensive damage has been done to U.S. credibility and 
trust issues with its foreign allies who no longer blindly trust 
the United States with their intelligence secrets.  Our allies 
have reassessed the level of their cooperation on intelligence 
                                                 
68 Bamford, supra note 54. “And when we’re talking about things like 
terrorist cells, nuclear proliferators – these are organised cells. These 
are things an individual cannot do on their own. So if they abstain 
from communicating, we’ve already won. If we’ve basically talked 
the terrorists out of using our modern communications networks, we 
have benefited in terms of security – we haven’t lost.” Id. 
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sharing since the United States has been shown incapable of 
keeping secrets and even occasionally spies on its closest 
foreign partners.  Foreign allies may be hesitant to cooperate 
on the next terrorism investigation. Communications service 
providers that were willing to cooperate with the government 
previously on issues dealing with national security and efforts 
to combat terrorism are now exposed, and may refuse to 
cooperate with the government in the future without being 




It is not surprising Snowden revealed top secret 
information on NSA surveillance programs twelve years after 
9/11. When the PATRIOT Act, which provided the IC and law 
enforcement with expansive surveillance and investigative 
powers, passed in 2001, the law had strong popular support. 
Americans feared for their safety. The government took 
significant legal steps to ensure they would be better able to 
attempt to predict and prevent another terrorist attack before 
it occurred, and they have been, for the most part, extremely 
successful in thwarting other 9/11-type attacks. Therefore, it is 
ironic that the IC’s own success has paved the way for 
whistleblowers such as Snowden to gain sufficient popularity 
in order to reveal NSA programs under the guise of being 
concerned about our right to privacy. The pendulum has 
swung the other way, and Americans are more concerned 
about potentially being monitored by the government than 
they were immediately after 9/11. If the government had been 
unsuccessful in preventing attacks, the concern would be 
entirely different. The question would be what more can the 
IC do to prevent such attacks from occurring rather than the 
current question as to why the government is collecting so 
much personal data. The risk of terrorist attacks seems to be, at 
the very least, stabilized, and the bigger concern is our civil 
liberties. Due to its success, the IC is now on the defensive (for 
the opposite reason, i.e., intelligence failures identified post 
9/11, the IC was encouraged to go on the offense).  The 
pendulum swings in both directions.  
In short, all the media hype and “24/7 surveillance 
state” diatribes should be taken with a grain of salt.  The 
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moniker “big, bad government” is a misnomer although our 
system remains imperfect.   Our leadership and government 
employees are for the most part decent, honest, reliable folks 
who are doing their jobs to the best of their ability. Some 
government employees are abusing their power and should be 
punished.  When discussing government surveillance 
practices, there must be adequate oversight to avoid 
widespread, abusive practices that gradually become so 
pervasive that they are deemed acceptable: the habitual, 
standard routine that becomes self-justifying and immune to 
conscience and ethical scrutiny. However, full and specific 
disclosure when it comes to the sensitive nature of intelligence 
collection and its analysis is unnecessary.  There are legal 
remedies, anonymous tip lines, and multiple avenues to report 
wrong doing when a whistleblower becomes concerned about 
“perceived” illegal activity by the government.  Snowden did 
not pursue most of these legal remedies before disclosing 
classified information to the media.  It is true that certain 
aspects of NSA’s bulk collection and interception efforts may 
require further review and legal clarifications, but such 
discussions need not take place on the front page of 
newspapers.    The recent disclosures of NSA abuse as 
“perceived” by Snowden do not come close to the pervasive 
abuses described by the Church Committee in the seventies. 
Despite Snowden’s pleas for an open-source 
community free from monitoring, the Internet is not and will 
not be free from surveillance regardless if the NSA participates 
or not. It is naive to think otherwise.  The government needs to 
collect and analyze intelligence information in order to arrive 
at the best domestic, foreign, economic, military, law 
enforcement, or political decisions possible, and that includes 
policy decisions on the fight against terrorism.   
In one interview, Snowden makes reference to the 
German Stasi that conducted “mass, indiscriminate spying 
campaigns”69 in communist-dominated East Germany where 
the secret police collected information on roughly one quarter 
of the population.70 The NSA is not the Stasi of East Germany 
                                                 
69 Rusbridger & Macaskill, supra note 48. 
70 Julia Angwin, You Know Who Else Collected Metadata? The Stasi., 
PROPUBLICA, Feb. 11, 2014, 
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– the NSA is not conducting mass, indiscriminate spying 
campaigns hoping to catch anti-government protestors in 
incriminating positions in order to lock them away and 
eliminate any and all dissent. Stasi-like dossiers are not being 
created on individuals who vote a certain way or oppose 
government policies.  NSA does not monitor U.S. citizens to 
identify their daily activities, what errands they run, what 
websites they are viewing, and how their children are doing in 
school. What NSA does do is collect positive intelligence 
information, foreign intelligence information which is 
collected and analysed under legal parameters.  These 
collection efforts are meant to protect U.S. citizens from future 
terrorist attacks and future cyber-attacks. Under section 702, 
targeting and minimization procedures are in place, and FISA 
warrants are required when the NSA wants to target U.S. 
citizens suspected of being agents of a foreign power.  
It is not the government surveillance programs we 
should be overly concerned about.  Public discussion and 
congressional and internal oversight committees keep those 
necessary but controversial programs under control and 
within legal parameters. It is the few isolated cases of 
individuals within the government who abuse their power 
and betray the American people who are of major concern, 
e.g., those who abuse their power and violate sections 215, 702 
and FISA laws.  Those are the illegalities that should be 
brought to light, not our government’s specific sources, 
methods, capabilities, and successes that our enemies 
desperately want revealed.  













DAMMING THE LEAKS: 
BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY,   






In the last few years we have had a number of infamous 
national security leaks and prosecutions.  Many have argued 
that these people have done a great service for our nation by 
revealing the wrongdoings of the defense agencies.  However, 
the law is quite clear- those national security employees who 
leak classified information are subject to lengthy prison 
sentences or in some cases, even execution as a traitor. In 
response to the draconian national security laws, this article 
proposes a new policy which fosters the free flow of 
information.  First, the article outlines the recent history of 
national security leaks and the government response to the 
perpetrators. Next, the article outlines the information policy 
of the defense industry including the document classification 
system, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
whistleblower laws and the Espionage Act. Finally, the article 
outlines a new policy that will advance government 
transparency by promoting whistleblowing that serves the 
public interest, while balancing it with government efficiency 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Media and the Arts, 
State University of New York-Oswego. 
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by encouraging proper channels of dissemination that actually 
respond to exposures of government mismanagement.  
 
“The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the 
expense of informed representative 
government provides no real security for our Republic.” 
Justice Hugo Black2 
 
“The oath of allegiance is not an oath of secrecy [but rather] an 





In today’s digital media landscape, it is becoming more 
difficult to adequately balance the people’s need to access 
information with the government’s need to operate with some 
semblance of secrecy. U.S. legal precedent, such as The 
Pentagon Papers4 and Bartnicki,5 makes it nearly impossible for 
the government to punish or restrain journalists’ ability to 
reveal lawfully obtained truthful information. Additionally, 
the mainstreaming of “new media”6 has dissolved any clear 
                                                 
2 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) 
(Black, J., concurring). 
3 Barton Gellman, Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations, 





4 New York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers), 403 
U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that the Government did not show a 
compelling interest to restrain the publication of contents of a top-
secret study that analyzed the United States’ military involvement in 
the Vietnam War).  
5 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
6 In 2009, 44% of Americans were getting their news from online or 
other mobile devices. 58% of Americans got their news from 
television, 34% from radio, and 31% from newspapers. See generally 
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definition of “journalist” and “journalism.”7 Thus, the 
principles that the nation seeks to protect- transparency and 
accountability, as well as public safety and efficient 
government- are being challenged, as it is uncertain who is 
working to inform the public and who is working to harm the 
status quo.8  
When the government acts illegally or there is gross 
mismanagement, it is fairly easy to defend the need to expose 
such transgressions. Traditional media outlets do expose 
illegal government actions. For example, during the last 
decade’s War on Terror, traditional media sources have 
revealed CIA torture of enemy combatants,9 the existence of 
                                                                                                       
Americans Spending More Time Following the News, PEW RES. CENTER, 
Sept. 12, 2010, http://people-press.org/2010/09/12/americans-
spending-more-time-following-the-news/. 
7 See Laura Durity, Shielding Journalist-“Bloggers”: The Need to Protect 
Newsgathering Despite the Distribution Medium, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 
Apr. 7, 2006, at 11 (arguing that attempts at federal shield law too 
narrowly defined ‘journalist’ in the digital age). 
8 New York Times Editor Bill Keller has called WikiLeaks “a 
secretive cadre of anti-secrecy vigilantes.” Bill Keller, Dealing with 
Assange and the WikiLeaks Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/magazine/30Wikileaks-
t.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1301544720-
v+nf9IYPS5RuUCMfTb6Aeg.  More vitriolic is Conservative Pundit 
and Tea Party Spokesperson, Glenn Beck, who has described 
WikiLeaks as part of an international cabal determined to create a 
new world order, stating: 
What I'm talking to you about is what al Qaeda is 
calling “operation hemorrhage” for their part. What 
I have called the perfect storm, where like-minded 
people, people who want to destroy the republic, 
seize an opportunity. And the window for 
opportunity for anarchy and chaos on this planet, to 
overthrow our system here and the systems abroad 
is now. 
Glenn Beck, WikiLeaks Questions, FOX NEWS, Nov. 30, 2010, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2010/11/30/glenn-beck-
wikileaks-questions.html. 
9 See, e.g., Exposing the Truth of Abu Ghraib (CBS television broadcast 
Dec. 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/exposing-the-truth-of-abu-
ghraib/. 
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secret international prisons administered by the CIA referred 
to as ‘black sites,’10 and the Bush Administration’s secret 
wiretapping and NSA surveillance programs.11 But when it 
comes to shining light on the actions of our national security 
and defense agencies, it is not enterprising journalists who 
‘discover’ secrets; it is employees within the agencies who 
decide to inform the public of the actions which they believe to 
be harmful to the nation.  
The government did not want these transgressions 
revealed to the public. But no criminal charges were brought 
against the respective news outlets for these revelations12  
because traditional media outlets exist in a legal framework 
that protects journalists.13 However, the legal framework does 
                                                 
10 See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 2, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html. Prior to 
this Washington Post article, these sites were only known to “a 
handful of officials in the United States and, usually, only to the 
president and a few top intelligence officers in each host country.” 
Id. 
11 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-
on-callers-without-courts.html.  The government argued that 
publication of the story would alert the terrorists that they were 
being watched. Id.  
12 To have done so would certainly have been politically unpopular, 
but it is possible that criminal charges would have held up in court.  
“Undoubtedly Congress has the power to enact specific and 
appropriate criminal laws to protect government property and 
preserve government secrets.”  New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 
(Stewart, J., concurring); see also Walter Pincus, Prosecution of 
Journalists Is Possible in NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, May 22, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100348.html. 
13 Journalists are protected by an exception under the Espionage Act 
and by case law such as The Pentagon Papers and Bartnicki. However, 
they are not constitutionally protected from being compelled to 
divulge their sources in federal court.  See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U.S. 665 (1972). Cf. Jason Zenor, Shielding Acts of Journalism: Open 
Leak Sites, National Security and the Free Flow of Information, 39 NOVA 
L. REV. 365 (2015) (arguing for a statutory protection of journalists 
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not protect the sources of this information, thus the 
government zealously pursues the leakers.14   
In 2013, Edward Snowden gained infamy after he fled 
the country and leaked classified information pertaining to an 
NSA surveillance program.15 Some argue that Snowden is a 
patriot and hero.16 He opened our eyes- though it was widely 
suspected, most Americans did not realize the span of 
government surveillance that was happening and what was 
allowed by the PATRIOT Act.17 The leaks also revealed illegal 
surveillance of foreign leaders.18 He exposed the actions of the 
government which are not supported by the Constitution.  
Yet, others argue that Snowden’s leaks have severely 
harmed the U.S. government’s interests.19 They made the 
government’s enemies, specifically terrorist groups, aware of 
how the U.S. intelligence entities operate. They have soured 
relationships between U.S. and foreign governments, 
especially those in which it was revealed that the U.S. had 
spied on them. Furthermore, foreign governments and private 
companies working with the U.S. government may be hesitant 
to share information for fear it will be exposed. Ultimately, the 
government is fearful that every secret is now fair game and a 
government cannot function in this way. 
                                                                                                       
who disseminate leaked national security information that serves the 
public interest). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2012). 
15 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining 
Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. 





16 See, e.g., Douglas Rushkoff, Edward Snowden is a Hero, CNN, June 
10, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/10/opinion/rushkoff-
snowden-hero/index.html. 
17 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 11. 
18 See generally, Snowden NSA: Germany to Investigate Merkel Phone 
Tap, BBC NEWS, June 4, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-27695634. 
19 See, e.g., Michael Hayden, Ex-CIA Chief: What Edward Snowden Did, 
CNN, July 19, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/opinion/hayden-snowden-
impact/index.html. 
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This article attempts to resolve the unease caused by 
national security leaks by proposing a new policy on the free 
flow of information in the 21st Century. This proposal 
attempts to balance government transparency with 
government efficiency. This new policy will advance 
transparency by promoting ‘whistleblowing’ on national 
security misconduct. It will promote government efficiency by 
encouraging proper channels of dissemination while 
guaranteeing protections that current laws do not. Part II of 
the article outlines the recent history of national security leaks 
and the government response to the perpetrators. Part III of 
the article outlines the information policy of the defense 
industry including the document classification system, FOIA, 
whistleblower law and the Espionage Act. Finally, Part IV of 
the article proposes the new policy that will advance 
government transparency by promoting whistleblowing that 
serves the public interest, while balancing it with government 
efficiency by encouraging proper channels of dissemination 
and responsive government.  
 
II. THE WHISTLEBLOWERS 
 
A. BRADLEY MANNING 
 
Bradley Manning was an intelligence analyst who 
reviewed classified material during the Iraq War.20 In 2010, 
Manning copied much of the classified material that she 
encountered and leaked it to WikiLeaks, an open leaks site 
that uses encrypted software to protect anonymity of those 
who leak classified information.21 WikiLeaks published 
thousands of documents including the “Afghan War Diary,”22 
                                                 
20 Profile: Private First Class Manning, BBC NEWS, Apr. 23, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-11874276. 
21 Paul Courson & Matt Smith, WikiLeaks Source Manning Gets 35 
Years, Will Seek Pardon, CNN, Aug. 22, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/21/us/bradley-manning-
sentencing/. 
22 This consisted of over 750,000 pages of never-before-released 
documents relating to the war in Afghanistan. See Alastair Dant & 
David Leigh, Afghanistan War Logs: Our Selection of Significant 
Incidents, THE GUARDIAN, July 25, 2010, 
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“The Iraq War Logs,”23 and State Department documents 
known as “Cablegate.”24 They also released a video titled 
“Collateral Murder” which showed gun-sight footage of a 
2007 airstrike in Baghdad that killed a Reuters reporter and 
innocent civilians including children.25 
Manning had confided in a friend, Adrian Lamo, that 
she had leaked the information.26 Lamo then notified the U.S. 
                                                                                                       
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/interactive/2010/jul
/25/afghanistan-war-logs-events. 
23 This consisted of almost 400,000 documents relating to the war in 
Iraq.  See Iraq: The War Logs, THE GUARDIAN, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iraq-war-logs. 
24 Julian Barnes, What Bradley Manning Leaked, WALL STREET J., Aug. 
21, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/08/21/what-
bradley-manning-leaked/. 
25 Full footage of Collateral Murder is available at: Collateral Murder – 
Wikileaks – Iraq, YOUTUBE.COM, 
http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=http%3A//www.y
outube.com/watch%3Fv%3D5rXPrfnU3G0.  Julian Assange, 
WikiLeaks founder, commented on the naming of the video: “[w]e 
want to knock out this 'collateral damage' euphemism, and so when 
anyone uses it they will think, ‘collateral murder.’” Greg Mitchell, 
One Year Ago: How the ‘Era of WikiLeaks’ Began—With ‘Murder’, HUFF.  
POST, Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-
mitchell/one-year-ago-how-the-era_b_841376.html). The soldiers’ 
reactions are documented on the film:  “[l]ook at those dead 
bastards,” one pilot says. “Nice,” the other responds. A wounded 
man can be seen crawling and the pilots impatiently hope that he 
will try to fire at them so that, under the rules of engagement, they 
can shoot him again. “All you gotta do is pick up a weapon,” one 
pilot says. A short time later a van arrives to pick up the wounded 
and the pilots open fire on it, wounding two children inside. “Well, 
it’s their fault for bringing their kids into a battle,” one pilot says. At 
another point, an American armored vehicle arrives and appears to 
roll over one of the dead. “I think they just drove over a body,” one 
of the pilots says, chuckling a little. The U.S. media had initially 
covered the incident, but little time was spent on it. See, e.g., Alissa 
Rubin, 2 Iraqi Journalists Killed as U.S. Forces Clash with Militias, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.h
tml. 
26 Ed Pilkington, Adrian Lamo Tells Manning Trial About Six Days of 
Chats with Accused Leaker, THE GUARDIAN, June 4, 2013, 
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Army of Mannings’ actions.27 Just weeks after the video was 
posted, the military arrested Manning and she was charged 
with twenty-two offenses including violations of the 
Espionage Act and “aiding the enemy.”28 In February 2013, 
Manning pled guilty to ten counts and was tried for the 
remaining charges.29 In July 2013, Bradley Manning was 
convicted on seventeen counts and sentenced to thirty-five 
years in prison.30 She is serving her sentence in maximum 
security at the Army’s Fort Leavenworth prison in Kansas.31 
 
B. EDWARD SNOWDEN 
 
Edward Snowden worked for the CIA from 2006-
2009.32  Starting in 2009, Snowden worked as a private national 
security contractor with the NSA’s surveillance programs.33  In 
2013, he left his contracting job and flew to Hong Kong with a 
plan to leak classified information about the NSA’s 
surveillance programs to the press.34  




28 Conviction of “aiding the enemy” could have resulted in 
execution. Jim Miklaszewski & Courtney Kube, Manning Faces New 




29 Profile: Private First Class Manning, supra note 20.  
30  Manning was acquitted of aiding the enemy which may have been 
punishable by execution.  He has the possibility of parole after 
another eight years. Courson & Smith, supra note 21. 
31 John Hanna, Bradley Manning Prison Term Will Be Served at Fort 
Leavenworth, HUFF. POST, Aug. 21, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/21/bradley-manning-
prison_n_3792135.html.  
32 John Broder & Scott Shane, For Snowden, A Life of Ambition, Despite 




34 Id. Snowden claimed that he had made several complaints to his 
superiors about the legality of the surveillance program, but was 
told to remain quiet. The U.S. government claims that there is no 
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The Guardian published Snowden’s claims that the 
NSA, with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s 
approval, was collecting telephone records both 
internationally and domestically.35 The Guardian released 
specific information on the NSA’s methodologies, the 
operation of classified intelligence courts, and the U.S. 
government’s relationship with foreign governments.36 The 
information implicated the wrongdoing of both the U.S. and 
U.K. governments.37  
 Shortly after the publications, Snowden publically 
identified himself as the source of the leak.38 The U.S. 
government charged Snowden with violating the Espionage 
Act by stealing and disclosing state secrets.39 Snowden spent 
several weeks as a fugitive while he waited for asylum.40 
Finally, Russia granted asylum to Snowden in August of 2013, 
where he remains.41  
                                                                                                       
evidence that Snowden ever made complaints. See Charlie Savage, 
Snowden Says He Reported N.S.A. Surveillance Concerns Before Leaks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/world/europe/snowden-
says-he-reported-nsa-surveillance-concerns-before-leaks.html. 
35 See generally, Ewen MacAskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, 





38 Barton Gellman, Aaron Blake & Greg Miller, Edward Snowden 




39 This crime carries a punishment of not more than ten years in 
prison. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2012). 
40 Andre de Nesnera, Snowden May Face Tough Time in Russian 
Asylum, VOICE OF AMERICA (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://www.voanews.com/content/snowden-may-face-rocky-road-
in-russia/1734858.html. 
41 Id. The initial grant was for one year, but Russia then granted 
Snowden a three year residency.  Michael Birnbaum, Russia Grants 
Edward Snowden Residency for Three More Years, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-
grants-edward-snowden-residency-for-3-more-
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C. THOMAS DRAKE 
 
 Thomas Drake was an intelligence analyst who went to 
work for the NSA in 2001.42 He held several jobs with the 
NSA, including working in the Signals Intelligence 
Directorate, Cryptologic Systems and Professional Health 
Office and in the Directorate of Engineering.43 Drake worked 
on developing intelligence collection through digital 
networks.44 At that time there were two main tools that the 
NSA was deciding between:  the Trailblazer Project and the 
ThinThread Project.45 Drake favored the ThinThread project 
because he felt it protected the privacy of U.S. citizens and was 
a fraction of the cost.46 However, the NSA decided to move 
forward with the Trailblazer Project.47  
 Drake felt that the NSA’s actions were mismanagement 
and waste.48 In 2002, he decided to report it through the 
proper channels, including his superiors, the NSA Inspector 
General, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, 
and the Congressional Intelligence Committees of both houses 
of Congress.49 In 2004, the NSA Inspector General found that 
Drake’s concerns were legitimate and the Trailblazer project 
                                                                                                       
years/2014/08/07/8b257293-1c30-45fd-8464-
8ed278d5341f_story.html. 
42 His first day was September 11th, 2001. Jane Mayer, The Secret 
Sharer, THE NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/23/the-secret-
sharer. 
43 Frederick Reese, Sacrifices in Journalism and Whistleblowing: A 




45 Mayer, supra note 42. 
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Ellen Nakashima, Former NSA Executive Thomas A. Drake May Pay 
High Price for Media Leak, WASH. POST, July 14, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR2010071305992.html. 
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was wasteful at a price-tag of over $1 billion.50 The 
Department of Defense echoed those concerns in its 
subsequent reports.51 
 In 2006, Drake told Baltimore Sun reporter Siobhan 
Gorman about the waste happening at the NSA, including the 
Trailblazer program.52 In 2007, the FBI raided Drake’s home 
and found classified material in his possession.53 In 2010, a 
grand jury in Baltimore, Maryland indicted Drake pursuant to 
the Espionage Act for willfully releasing national defense 
information,54 as well as obstructing justice and making false 
statements to a federal officer.55  
Drake was not charged with disclosing classified 
information.56 Nonetheless, he faced a possible thirty-five 
years in prison.57 The U.S. government claimed that the 
prosecution was not in retaliation to Drake’s reporting of NSA 
waste, rather the prosecution stood on the merits of the case.58  
                                                 
50 R. Jeffrey Smith, Classified Pentagon Report Upholds Thomas Drake’s 




51 Id.  
52 Siobhan Gorman, Second-Ranking NSA Official Forced Out of Job by 
Director, BALTIMORE SUN, May 31, 2006, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-05-
31/news/0605310010_1_alexander-black-spy-agency. 
53 Gabrielle Levy, Exclusive Interview: NSA Whistleblower on What He’d 




54 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2012). 
55 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012). 
56 Bio: Thomas Drake, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, 
http://www.whistleblower.org/bio-thomas-drake (last visited Jan. 
28, 2014).  
57 David Wise, Leaks and the Law: The Story of Thomas Drake, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG., Aug. 2011, 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/leaks-and-the-law-the-
story-of-thomas-drake-14796786/. 
58 Scott Shane, Obama Takes a Hard Line Against Leaks to Press, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/us/politics/12leak.html.  
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Drake eventually struck a deal with the prosecution and pled 
guilty to a misdemeanor for misusing NSA’s computer 
system.59 He was sentenced to one year probation and 
community service.60  
 
D. STEPHEN JIN-WOO KIM 
 
Stephen Jin-Woo Kim was a private contractor that 
worked as a Senior Advisor in the State Department’s Bureau 
of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation.61 His job 
was to analyze North Korea’s nuclear program.62 In 2009, Kim 
told FOX News journalist James Rosen that North Korea was 
planning to test a nuclear bomb.63 In 2010, a grand jury 
indicted Kim pursuant to the Espionage Act for unauthorized 
disclosure of defense information,64 as well as making false 
statements.65 The information that Kim disclosed was not 
classified, but the information was in relation to ‘national 
defense.’66 Kim pled guilty to disclosing national defense 





                                                 
59 Wise, supra note 57. 
60 Id. 
61 Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 2, United 
States v. Jin-Woo Kim, 2013 WL 3866545 (D.D.C. July 24, 2013), 
available at http://fas.org/sgp/jud/kim/032414-sent.pdf.  
62 Id.  
63 Conor Friedersdorf, Did James Rosen’s Story on North Korea Do Any 
Harm?, THE ATLANTIC, May 23, 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/did-james-
rosens-story-on-north-korea-do-any-harm/276152/. 
64 18 U.S.C. § 793(d). 
65 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). 
66 Mark Hosenball, Justice Department Indicts Contractor in Alleged 
Leak, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2010, 
http://www.newsweek.com/justice-department-indicts-contractor-
alleged-leak-217186. 
67 Josh Gerstein, Contractor Pleads Guilty in Leak Case, POLITICO, Feb. 7, 
2014, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/stephen-kim-james-
risen-state-department-fox-news-103265. 
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E. JEFFREY STERLING 
 
Sterling began working as an officer for the CIA in 
1993.68 In 2000, Sterling filed a complaint with the CIA’s Equal 
Employment Office alleging racial discrimination.69 In 2001, 
Sterling was placed on administrative leave, and his classified 
information privileges were revoked.70 In 2002, the CIA 
terminated him.71 Sterling’s subsequent lawsuit against the 
CIA was dismissed because the trial would have disclosed 
classified information.72 In 2005, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the case’s dismissal.73  
 In 2010, the U.S. government indicted Sterling for 
violating the Espionage Act with his unauthorized disclosure 
of the national defense information.74 The government 
discovered emails and telephone communication between 
Sterling and The New York Times reporter, James Risen.75 The 
U.S. government claimed that Sterling detailed the CIA’s 
secret plot to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program by giving the 
                                                 
68 Matt Apuzzo, C.I.A. Officer is Found Guilty in Leak Tied to Times 




70 Former CIA Officer Convicted of Violating Espionage Act, SKY VALLEY 






72 Josh Gerstein, Ex-CIA Officer Found Guilty in Leak Trial, POLITICO, 
Jan. 26, 2015, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/jeffrey-
sterling-convicted-cia-leak-trial-114605.html. 
73 See Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Warren 
Richey, Former Covert CIA Agent Charged with Leaking Secrets to 
Newspaper, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 6, 2011, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0106/Former-
covert-CIA-agent-charged-with-leaking-secrets-to-newspaper. 
74 The indictment also charged mail fraud and obstruction of justice. 
Apuzzo, supra note 68. 
75 Id. 
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foreign government misinformation.76 Risen wrote about the 
mission in his book and painted it as a mismanaged and 
potentially dangerous campaign that may have aided Iran’s 
nuclear program.77   
Sterling pled not guilty to all counts.78 There was no 
direct proof that Sterling had given this information to Risen.79 
In fact, Sterling had gone to the U.S. Senate in 2003 to report 
the program.80 His attorneys argued that Risen could have 
pieced together the information from leaks on Capitol Hill.81  
Despite the lack of solid evidence, in January 2015, Sterling 
was convicted.  In May 2015 he was sentenced to forty-two 
months, much less than had been anticipated.82  
 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION 
 
The paramount concern of the First Amendment is to 
protect the free flow of information to the people concerning 
issues of public interest.83 As Justice’s Black and Douglas 
explained in concurring opinions in The Pentagon Papers, 
                                                 
76 Id.  
77 See generally, JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF 
THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006). 
78 See Apuzzo, supra note 68.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Sterling claimed that he only discussed his discrimination suit 
against the CIA with Risen. Id.  
82 Matt Apuzzo, Ex-C.I.A. Officer Sentenced in Leak Case Tied to Times 
Reporter, May 11, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/us/ex-cia-officer-sentenced-
in-leak-case-tied-to-times-reporter.html. 
83 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77, 85 (1964). As Justice 
Breyer argued in Garcetti: “Government administration typically 
involves matters of public concern. Why else would government be 
involved? And ‘public issues,’ indeed, matters of ‘unusual 
importance,’ are often daily bread-and-butter concerns for the police, 
the intelligence agencies, the military, and many whose jobs involve 
protecting the public's health, safety, and the environment.” Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 448 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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“[s]ecrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic.”84 
When our government shrouds itself in secrecy, it “provides 
no real security for our Republic.”85  Accordingly, it is “only a 
free and unrestrained press [that] can effectively expose 
deception in government,”86 but, “[a] free press cannot be 
made to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to 
supply it with information.”87  Instead, it is government 
employees speaking out against their employers who are often 
in the best position to expose deception in government.88  
Consequently, public debate has much to gain when 
government employees speak.89 
 
B. ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
 
1. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
 
The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was 
passed in 1966.90 Prior to FOIA, the only two public 
information laws were the Administrative Procedures Act of 
                                                 
84 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) 
(Douglas, J., concurring).  
85 Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).  
86 Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).   
87 Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g, 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979) (holding that 
newspapers could not be punished for publishing the name of a 
juvenile rape victim discovered from listening to police radio 
signals). 
88 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that 
government employee speech could not be abridged unless the 
government could show that the employee was not speaking on a 
matter of public concern and it disrupted government 
administration). 
89 Id. 
90 See Martin E. Halstuk, When Secrecy Trumps Transparency: Why the 
Open Government Act of 2007 Falls Short, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 
427 (2008) (detailing the history of FOIA); see also Martin Halstuk, 
The Freedom of Information Act 1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of 
Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in What the Government’s up 
to, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511 (2006) (detailing the evolution of privacy 
exemptions in FOIA). 
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194691 and the Housekeeping Statute of 1789.92  Both Acts gave 
the executive branch unlimited discretion as to what 
information it could keep secret.93  FOIA, on the other hand, 
amended the APA to add a presumption of openness for all 
federal documents.94  But FOIA did provide nine exemptions, 
including one for national security.95 Other exemptions 
included trade secrets,96 personal privacy rights,97 internal 
practices,98 and ongoing law enforcement proceedings.99 FOIA 
has eliminated much of the government’s preference for 
secrecy in order to protect political embarrassment and 
concordantly, courts have construed the exemptions 
narrowly.100  
In 1974, after Watergate, Congress amended the FOIA 
because of perceived abuse with the national security 
                                                 
91 Administrative Procedure Act § 3, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, 
238 (1946). 
92 Act of Sept. 15, 1789, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 68 (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. § 301 (2006)). 
93 See Halstuk, supra note 90. 
94 See, e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 
(1989). 
95 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“This section does not apply to 
matters that are specifically authorized under criteria established by 
an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national 
defense or foreign policy[.]”). 
96 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4) (“This section does not apply to matters that are 
trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from 
a person and privileged or confidential[.]”). 
97 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (“This section does not apply to matters that 
are personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of 
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy[.]”); See also S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 38 (1965) (“At the same 
time that a broad philosophy of ‘freedom of information’ is enacted 
into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights of 
privacy . . . such as medical and personnel files.”). 
98 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), (5); See also S. Rep. No 89-813, at 44 (1965) 
(Exception 5 recognized that the “[g]overnment would be greatly 
hampered if, with respect to legal and policy matters, all 
Government agencies were prematurely forced to ‘operate in a 
fishbowl.’”). 
99 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 
100 See, e.g., Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) 
(granting FOIA request for Air Force Academy Honor Code). 
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exemption.101 Congress also amended the law enforcement 
exemption to require that the government show the requested 
record was compiled for law enforcement and that publication 
would result in an enumerated harm.102 But, in 1986, the 
national security and law enforcement exemption were 
expanded to include terrorism.103 It also exempted matters that 
are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an 
Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national 
defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified 
pursuant to such Executive Order.”104  Furthermore, in FOIA 
cases dealing with national security exemptions, courts 
continue to give great deference to the executive branch 
defining what constitutes potential harms from releasing 
documents.105 
 
2. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
 
At the federal level, documents can be classified as 
“top secret,” “secret,” or “confidential.”106 The last two 
overhauls of the government document classification system 
came in 1995107 and 2003,108 during the Clinton and Bush 
                                                 
101 See Halstuk, supra note 90.  
102 Id. 
103 See James Goldston, Jennifer Granholm & Robert Robinson, A 
Nation Less Secured: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L.  REV 409 (1986) (reviewing 1986 amendments to FOIA). 
104 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
105 It is “well-established that the judiciary owes some measure of 
deference to the executive in cases implicating national security, a 
uniquely executive purview.”  Ctr. for Nat’l Security Studies v. Dep’t 
of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (denying FOIA 
request for name of detainees). Cf. Nathan Slegers, De Novo Review 
Under The Freedom of Information Act: The Case Against Judicial 
Deference to Agency Decisions to Withhold Information, 43 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 209 (2006).  
106 See David McGinty, The Statutory and Executive Development of the 
National Security Exemption to Disclosure Under the Freedom of 
Information Act: Past and Present, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 67 (2005). 
107 Classified National Security Information (Clinton Order), Exec. Order 
No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, 19,843 (Apr. 17, 1995). Prior to FDR 
Administration establishing a classification system, each agency had 
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Administrations respectively. Under the Clinton Order, a 
document must have an articulable impact on national 
security in order to be classified.109  National security was 
defined as “national defense or foreign relations of the United 
States.”110  The Clinton Order established the Interagency 
Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) that reviews 
employee and public (non-FOIA) challenges to the 
classification of documents.111 The President appoints the 
members of ISCAP and is made of senior level members of the 
Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of 
Justice, and National Archives.112  
 In 2003, the Bush Order amended the 1995 order.113 
First, it removed a clause that stated information “shall not be 
classified” whenever there “is significant doubt about the need 
                                                                                                       
full discretion to classify documents without requiring justification. 
See Exec. Order No. 8381. 5 Fed. Reg. 1147 (Mar. 22, 1940).   
108 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003) 
reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006). 
109 Prior to the Clinton Order, there was a category that protected 
“confidential sources” and an ambiguous “catchall category.” See 
McGinty, supra note 106. 
110 In order to be labeled confidential, there has to be identifiable 
damage if the document were to be released. Information that can be 
classified includes:  
“military plans, weapons systems, or operations”; 
“foreign government information”; “intelligence 
activities (including special activities), intelligence 
sources or methods, or cryptology”; “scientific, 
technological, or economic matters relating to the 
national security, which includes defense against 
transnational terrorism”; “United States 
Government programs for safeguarding nuclear 
materials or facilities”; “vulnerabilities or 
capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, 
projects, plans, or protection services relating to the 
national security, which includes defense against 
transnational terrorism”; or “weapons of mass 
destruction.”  
Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003). 
111 See Classified National Security Information (Clinton Order), supra 
note 107. 
112 Id. 
113 Exec. Order No. 13,292, supra note 108. 
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to classify” it.114 The Bush Order also omitted a requirement to 
classify information at the lower of two possible classification 
levels when there is uncertainty as to which level is 
appropriate.115 The Bush Order also added that “[t]he 
unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information is 
presumed to cause damage to the national security.”116 Finally, 
the 2003 order allows for the reclassification of previously 
declassified, public documents. 117  
 In 2009, the Obama Administration executed its own 
order to amend the classification system. The new system has 
a presumption against classification.118 Also, employees are 
expected to voice objections to the ISCAP when they disagree 
with classifications in good faith.119 But, agencies have 
discretion to classify any information that may hurt national 
security−though this is not defined.120 National Security 
agency heads can also delay the ISCAP declassification of 
documents by seeking an appeal to the President.121 
                                                 
114 Id.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. See Jane Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of 
Terror: The Bush Administration’s Assault on the Freedom of Information, 
11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 479 (2006) (reviewing how the Bush 
Administration’s changes to classification systems affected free flow 
of information). 
118 Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.1(b), 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). 
119 Id. at § 1.8.  
120 Id. at § 1.2. Cf. Reducing Over-Classification Act, H.R. 553, 111th 
Cong. (2010). The purpose of the act is to “prevent federal 
departments and agencies from unnecessarily classifying 
information or classifying information at a higher and more 
restricted level than is warranted, and by doing so to promote 
information sharing across departments and agencies and with State, 
local, tribal and private sector counterparts, as appropriate.” Id. For a 
discussion on the classification system in the United States, see 
Wendy Keefer, Protection of Information to Preserve National Security: Is 
WikiLeaks Really the Issue?, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 457 (2011).    
121 Id. at § 3. Between 1996-2008, ISCAP voted to declassify (whole or 
in-part) 495 of 796 documents (64%). Steven Aftergood, Reducing 
Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399, 
407 (2009).  Despite the ISCAP’s acceptance of transparency, there is 
plenty of evidence that executive agencies have become more secret 
after 9/11, often invoking the mosaic theory that even documents 
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C. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS AND PUNISHMENTS 
 
1. FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 
 
Federal employees are protected by a patchwork of 
whistleblower protections.122 These laws include 
Whistleblower Act of 1989,123 which protects civilian 
employees from wrongful dismissal, and the No FEAR Act,124 
which makes agencies directly and financially responsible for 
illegal retaliation. The Department of Labor houses the Office 
of the Whistleblower Protection Program that “administers the 
whistleblower protection provisions of more than twenty 
whistleblower protection statutes” for civilian employees.125  
Members of the U.S. military are protected by the Military 
                                                                                                       
that, on their own, do not concern national security are connected 
somehow to national security interests, thus, must be classified. See, 
e.g., David Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the 
Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L. J. 628 (2005).    
122 See Sarah Wood Borak, The Legacy of “Deep Throat”: The Disclosure 
Process of the Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the 
No FEAR Act of 2002, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617 (2005)  (documenting 
the history of federal whistleblower statutes). Congress passed the 
first Whistleblower statutes in 1778. The law protected soldiers who 
reported inhumane treatment of POWs. Stephen M. Kohn, The 
Whistle-Blowers of 1777, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/opinion/13kohn.html. 
123 Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified as amended 5 
U.S.C. § 2302 (2012)). 
124 Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and 
Retaliation Act of 2002 (No FEAR Act), Pub. L. No. 107-74, § 104, 116 
Stat. 566 (2002).  
125 Federal employees can “report violations of workplace safety and 
health, airline, commercial motor carrier, consumer product, 
environmental, financial reform, food safety, health insurance 
reform, motor vehicle safety, nuclear, pipeline, public transportation 
agency, railroad, maritime, and securities laws.” The employees are 
protected from retaliation in the form of “blacklisting, demoting, 
denying overtime or promotion, disciplining, denial of benefits, 
failure to hire or rehire, intimidation, making threats, reassignment 
affecting prospects for promotion, or reducing pay or hours[.]” 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAMS, 
www.whistleblowers.gov (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
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Whistleblower Protection Act.126 This Act protects the military 
members’ ability to report a violation of the law to members of 
Congress, Inspector Generals, chains of command, or other 
law enforcement.127 
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Garcetti v. 
Ceballos.128 The case limited the free speech rights of 
government employees by not protecting speech that was 
conducted within the official job duties.129  The U.S. House of 
Representatives responded by proposing a bill titled the 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007.130  The bill 
would have expanded the protections afforded to federal 
employees who disclosed government waste, fraud and 
abuse.131  The Act also granted access to jury trials132 for 
government employees who had been retaliated against. The 
                                                 
126 See 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (2012). 
127 Military members can report “sexual harassment, unlawful 
discrimination, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an 
abuse of authority, or a substantial or specific danger to public 
health or safety.” UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, THE MILITARY 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT, 
http://www.uscg.mil/legal/MilitaryWhistlerBlowerProtectionAct.a
sp (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
128 547 U.S. 410 (2006). With the nebulous nature of job descriptions 
and the perpetuity of the workday due to advances in technology, it 
is arguable that a public employee is always working and can never 
speak without representing his or her employer. See generally Robert 
Drechsel, The Declining First Amendment Rights of Government News 
Sources: How Garcetti v. Ceballos Threatens the Flow of Newsworthy 
Information, 16 COMM. L & POL’Y 129 (2011) (arguing that the Garcetti 
prong has greatly curtailed public employee speech and the free 
flow of information). 
129 547 U.S. at 423. 
130 H.R. 985, 110th Cong. (2007). 
131 Id. 
132 Over the last seventeen years of whistleblower cases, the federal 
courts have sided with the government 210 times while siding with 
whistleblowers only three times. See Anniston Star Editorial Board, 
Holding up Progress, Senate’s Shameful Little Secret, ANNISTON STAR, 
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House passed the bill by a margin of 331-94.133 The Senate then 
passed its own whistleblower bill.134  But, it contained fewer 
protections with no access to jury trials.135  As a result, the two 
houses were unable to negotiate a compromise and the bill 
failed.136  
In 2009, the Senate proposed another Whistleblower 
Protection Enhancement Act. This bill would have provided 
for jury trials for federal employees and even protected 
employees in national security positions.137  However, in 2010 
after WikiLeaks revealed hundreds of leaked documents, 
Congress began to strip much of the legislation’s protections, 
including those for national security workers.138 Finally, in 
2012 the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act was 
finally passed.139 
Whistleblower law provides little protection for those 
who leak national security information. Congress recognized 
this and passed the Intelligence Community Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1998.140  This Act protected all employees 
and contractors of national security agencies who disclosed 
maters of “urgent concern” such as violation of the law, false 
statement to Congress, or retaliation against protected 
whistleblowers.141 However, whistleblowers could not make 
                                                 
133 Id. 
134 Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act, S. 274, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
135 Id. 
136 See Holding up Progress, Senate’s Shameful Little Secret, supra note 
132. 
137 The Senate added the national security clause after two 
Department of Homeland Security officials lost their jobs after 
alleging agency abuses. See Alan Maimon, WikiLeaks Furor Causes 
Defeat of Rights Bill with Las Vegas Ties, LAS VEGAS J. REV., Mar. 30, 
2011, http://www.lvrj.com/news/-wikileaks-furor-causes-defeat-
of-rights-bill-with-lv-ties-114920289.html. 
138 See Project on Government Oversight, How a Red Herring About 
WikiLeaks Killed Whistleblower Protections, HUFF. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/project-on-government-
oversight/how-a-red-herring-about-w_b_805915.html. 
139 Pub.L. No. 112–199, § 108(a), 126 Stat. 1468 (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)). 
140 Pub.L. No. 105–272, Title VII, 112 Stat. 2396 (1998) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 2302). 
141 50 U.S.C. § 3024 (2013). 
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disclosures directly to Congress. They had to make disclosures 
to the respective agency’s Inspector General who then must 
inform the agency head.142 Furthermore, the Inspector 
General’s decisions are not subject to judicial review.143  
Finally, agencies are open to remove security clearance, as 
courts have held that this is not a form of retaliation that is 
subject to review.144 
In 2012, the Obama Administration published 
Presidential Policy Directive 19.145 The directive extends some 
whistleblower protection to national security employees. Such 
employees cannot suffer retaliation for good faith reports of 
waste or fraud to his or her superiors, Inspector Generals or 
the Director of National Intelligence.146  Employees can appeal 
decisions of their superiors to a three-person panel made up of 
Inspector Generals, but the panel’s decision is subject to 
review by the agency head.147 Also, there is no right to an 
external review by a court.148 Ultimately, such a directive does 
not have the force of law and requires the agencies to adopt it. 
Future Presidents can change the policy.  
 
2. ESPIONAGE ACT 
 
The Espionage Act149 bars the disclosure of information 
regarding national defense. Sections 793(a)-(b) deal with 
disclosures to foreign governments, which can be punished 
with life in prison or death.150 Most of the recent national 
security leaks have been prosecuted pursuant to Section 
793(d). This section bars the willful transmission of any 
                                                 
142 The whistleblower can inform Congressional Intelligence 
Committees under certain conditions. Id. 
143 Id.  
144 See, e.g., Gargiulo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 727 F.3d 1181, 1185 
(Fed. Cir. 2013); Robinson v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 498 F.3d 1361, 
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
145 Presidential Policy Directive-19, Protecting Whistleblowers with 
Access to Classified Information (Oct. 10, 2012), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-19.pdf. 
146 Contractors are not included in the directive. Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (2006). 
150 Id. 
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national security document to persons “not entitled to receive 
it.”151  This section of the Espionage Act does not require 
actual harms, nor does it require that the information had been 
leaked to an enemy. Additionally, the leaker’s belief in the 
value the information has to the public is also irrelevant. Each 
violation of this section can be punished with up to ten years 
in prison.152 
 
IV. A POLICY PROPOSAL TO PROTECT THE FREE FLOW OF 
INFORMATION:  PROVIDING JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR 
WHISTLEBLOWERS IN NATIONAL SECURITY POSITIONS 
 
In order to promote whistleblowing, there must be a 
confidential channel and strong statutory protections for 
potential whistleblowers.153 Without such channels and 
protections, potential whistleblowers will turn to the 
traditional press, or more disconcerting, open leak 
platforms.154  The result will be unadulterated document 
dumping on transparency sites as we saw with Bradley 
Manning and WikiLeaks. Thus, Congress should amend the 
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act to 
promote internal communication.  
The amendments should create an external 
independent tribunal to review the classification of 
documents, specifically when a government employee or 
                                                 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  
153 Exec. Order 13,526 calls for federal employees to report misgiving 
about document classification and the ISCAP is available to review 
the complaints without fear of retribution to the employee. See Exec. 
Order No. 13,526, supra note 118. But, the ISCAP is made up of 
senior officials of national security agencies. This does not promote 
check and balances in government, nor would it be comforting to the 
employee. See, e.g., Geoffrey Stone, Our Untransparent President, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/opinion/27stone.html?hp 
(arguing that the Obama Administration has not backed 
whistleblower protection, has prosecuted more employees for leaks, 
and commonly claimed states secrets privilege). 
154 See supra Part II. 
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contractor is considering leaking a document.155 Potential 
whistleblowers can file a complaint with the independent 
tribunal and seek review of the classification.156  Similar to 
traditional FOIA cases, the tribunal would conduct in-camera 
reviews of the national security ‘secrets’ to determine if the 
document was properly classified.157 Furthermore, the 
complaint, the complainant and the judicial review will all be 
confidential.158 This will protect the whistleblower and 
promote legal channels.159 It will also protect the government 
and the confidentiality of documents that are found to be 
properly classified.  
 
1. THE NEW LEGAL STANDARD FOR DECLASSIFYING 
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
In reviewing the classified documents, the independent 
tribunal should apply the following five-part test.  In order to 
be properly classified, the government must show that the 
documents: 
 
1) contain information pertinent to national security;160  
and  
2) do not contain information about illegal government 
     actions.161  
                                                 
155 For another description of an independent tribunal reviewing 
government document classification, see Doug Meier, Changing with 
the Times: How the Government Must Adapt to Prevent the Publication of 
its Secrets, 28 REV. LITIG. 203 (2008). Editor’s Note: Mr. Meier takes a 
viewpoint much different than this author. Mr. Meier argues for 
enhancing the government’s ability to withhold information and 
prosecute all leakers. 
156 Id. 
157 For example, in the FOIA request for the torture pictures from 
Abu Ghraib, the court conducted an in camera review of the 
redacted reports and photos and decided that the interest in open 
government outweighs the privacy claims.  See Am. Civil Liberties 
Union v. Dep't of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). It 
cannot be classified only to cover-up embarrassing information. Id. 
158 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
159 Cf. Presidential Policy Directive 19, supra note 145. 
160 See supra Part III.C.2.   
161 Id. 
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Any documents that do not survive that test will automatically 
be declassified.162  If the classification survives the first two 
prongs, then the government can show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the information is either:  
1) not in the public interest;163 or 2) it will cause “direct, 
immediate and irreparable harm.”164 Then the information will 
remained classified. Finally, the court must apply a balancing 
test to determine whether the benefits of declassification 
outweigh the benefits to the public interest.165 
In order to promote ‘whistleblowers’ to use this 
independent review system, confidentiality will be offered to 
the employees who file a complaint. The proceedings will not 
be open to the public and the employees who filed for the 
review will not have their names revealed to the agency who 
he or she works for.166 Furthermore, as in other whistleblower 
laws, employees would be immune from civil or criminal 
liability167 and professional retaliation,168 if they follow the 
order of the panel. Any such retaliation should be a cause of 
                                                 
162 Similar to FOIA. See supra Part III.C.1. 
163 This will be similar to FOIA exemptions for privacy information 
and agency procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). (“This section does not 
apply to matters that are personnel and medical files and similar files 
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.”). See also S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965) 
(“At the same time that a broad philosophy of ‘freedom of 
information’ is enacted into law, it is necessary to protect certain 
equally important rights of privacy . . . such as medical and 
personnel files.”). 
164 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 
551 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713 (1971). 
165 “[T]he public interest in compelling disclosure of the information . 
. . outweighs the public interest in gathering or disseminating news 
or information.” See the Free Flow of Information Act of 2009, S. 448, 
111th Cong. (currently stalled in committee). 
166 Cf. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 1998, supra note 
140. 
167 Congress will have to amend the Espionage Act to allow for 
employees to bring such documents to the independent review 
board. See Meier, supra note 155, at 223.  
168 Congress would have to pass a law such as the Whistleblower 
Protection Enhancement Act to establish such protection. See supra 
Part III.C.1. 
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action for a civil suit against the agency that employs the 
complainant. 
Ultimately, the review board will serve as an 
ombudsman independent of the executive agencies. The 
composition of the independent tribunal is flexible. It could be 
a new independent tribunal made up of administrative law 
judges from different agencies169 or Congress could instead 
create a new court that deals specifically with matters of 
government-employees relations.170 Another suggestion is that 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court conduct the 
reviews.171 This court consists of eleven federal district court 
judges from seven of the United States judicial circuits.172   The 
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court appoints each judge 
for one seven year term, with a new judge appointed each 
year.173  This court is a natural fit because of its familiarity with 
matters of national security.174   
 
                                                 
169 The ALJ’s could be from the agencies most likely to be the source 
of leaks such as the Department of Defense, Department of State, and 
Department of Homeland Security. 
170 Congress has the authority to create new inferior courts. U.S. 
CONST. art. III. 
171 See Meier, supra note 155 at 223.  
172 Id. 
173 Id. Mr. Meier contends: 
The only real change that would need to be made to 
the current FISA court would be to add a 
requirement that when reviewing the status of 
national security documents, more than one judge 
would be required to make a decision, and a 
majority vote would be necessary to either affirm or 
reject the designation. 
Meier, supra note 155, at 222. 
174 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
511, § 103(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–
1871) (2012). Of course government transparency advocates would 
argue against the use of FISC as it rarely blocks the NSA’s actions.  
See Erika Eichelberger, FISA Court Has Rejected .03 Percent of all 
Government Surveillance Requests, MOTHER JONES, June 10, 2013, 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/06/fisa-court-nsa-
spying-opinion-reject-request. 
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2. DETERRING WHISTLEBLOWERS FROM TURNING TO 
EXTERNAL OUTLETS 
 
If the independent tribunal finds that the information 
does not warrant secret classification, then the executive 
agency must reclassify the documents.175 Furthermore, the 
whistleblower is then free to ‘blow the whistle’ and release the 
documents to any information platform,176 immune from civil 
or criminal proceedings and professional retaliation.  But, 
when the complainants are unsuccessful in their challenge to 
the documents’ classification, they will have two disparate 
choices.  
First, the federal employee (or contractor) can accept 
the tribunal’s order and return to work with the knowledge 
that he or she is statutorily protected, even if his or her 
anonymity is destroyed and he or she is retaliated against.  
The second choice is to become a traditional “leaker” of 
classified information. But, in these cases, the “whistleblower” 
is now legally a “leaker” and he or she will not have any 
protection. The employee will be at the mercy of current laws 
against “leakers,” including the Espionage Act.177 
Nevertheless, the original independent tribunal review will 
remain closed. To allow the government access to the original 
review would only deter people from using it.178 More 
                                                 
175 Then the press could access it through FOIA request, though it 
will not have to be automatically handed over to the press. But any 
FOIA request should be granted, since tribunal review will 
incorporate much of the consideration given in FOIA cases. 
However, there may be unforeseen roadblocks that Congress will 
have to fix by amending FOIA.  
176 This includes both traditional news media and new media 
platforms such as WikiLeaks.  
177 Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794. 
178 As Mr. Meier argues: 
On the other hand, if a person unsuccessfully 
challenges the designation and the document later 
ends up being leaked, the government should, at the 
very least, be able to use that person's identity in 
investigating the source of the leak. Of course, it 
cannot simply assume that the person was the 
leaker; to the contrary, it seems that the person who 
went to the trouble to get the document reviewed by 
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importantly, in cases where the information was leaked by 
someone other than the original complainant, it would 
unnecessarily punish good faith complainants who 
unsuccessfully used the internal check but still chose not to 




During the Obama Administration, eight people 
(government employees or contractors) have been prosecuted 
for violating the Espionage Act. Prior to 2009, only three 
people had ever been prosecuted. In many of the recent cases, 
information was reported to the public through the press. It 
was information that served the public interest and exposed 
government activity that ranged from mismanagement to 
outright criminal. In many of these cases, the whistleblower 
first attempted to use legal channels and report to superiors 
and then to Congress, but to no avail. It was the inaction 
inside the government that compelled these whistleblowers to 
go to the press. The cost to the whistleblower was often 
prosecution, conviction and jail time.180  
                                                                                                       
the court should be presumed not to be the leaker. 
However, the government could talk to that person 
in an effort to determine the source of the leak. It is 
doubtful that this would have any chilling effect 
because, as already discussed, the people who 
would be inclined to use the independent review 
court would generally be acting in good faith and 
would therefore be likely to abide by the court's 
ruling.   
Meier, supra note 155, at 223-224. 
179 If there was not confidentiality in the review process, the 
complainant would immediately become a suspect and his or her 
name would justifiably be associated with the leak without much 
recourse against the publicity. Though their job would be statutorily 
protected from retaliation for the original review, there are other 
concerns. Much of the deterrence for potential whistleblowers is the 
social retaliation from coworkers. See, e.g., Mindy Bergman et al., The 
(Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences of 
Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 230 (2002).  
180 Edward Snowden had to leave the country and take asylum in 
Russia. See supra Part II.B. 
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Ultimately the system is not working. Something needs 
to change. This article forwards a new policy that allows for 
concerned employees in the national security arena to report 
mismanagement in good faith, with the assurance that an 
independent body will hear them and protect them from 
retaliation. At the same time, the policy allows the government 
to protect secrets that are truly dangerous to our national 
security or information which will not serve the public interest 
if published. The new policy does not protect leakers who do 
not go through the proper channels. But, under the current 
laws, if a good faith whistleblower wants the public to know 
about transgressions in the intelligence and defense agencies, 
then going outside of the government is the only choice and it 
will continue to be.181 
                                                 
181 Current whistleblower protections “would give pause to even the 
most altruistic and well-intentioned whistleblowers.” Stephen I. 
Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After 
Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1535 (2008). 
 
 








COWARDLY TRAITOR OR HEROIC 
WHISTLEBLOWER?: 
THE IMPACT OF EDWARD SNOWDEN’S 
DISCLOSURES ON CANADA AND THE UNITED 






The ‘world’s most wanted man,’ Edward Snowden, 
might be one of the most polarizing figures in modern history.  
This is particularly true in the United States, where the debates 
pertaining to his leaks of classified information could not be 
more divided.  Many Americans, including senior level 
government officials, have publicly argued that Snowden is a 
cowardly traitor, and have forcefully stated their belief that 
Snowden should return home to face a myriad of criminal 
charges, including those under the 1917 Espionage Act.   
However, many others have gone to great lengths and taken 
immense personal risks to support Snowden and help further 
his goal of bringing to light some of the most egregious 
surveillance abuses ever released into the public sphere. 
                                                 
1 Dr. Daniel Alati is a post-doctoral researcher at the City University 
of Hong Kong.  His doctoral studies at the University of Oxford 
focused on comparative anti-terrorism mechanisms in Canada and 
the United Kingdom. 
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Snowden’s closest confidants are still eager to tell his story:  
Laura Poitras’ documentary ‘Citizenfour’ has received rave 
reviews2 and long-time NSA critic and journalist James 
Bamford recently interviewed Snowden in Moscow for 
WIRED magazine.3  They continue to release leaked 
documents that expose the greatest abuses of the global 
surveillance machine Glenn Greenwald’s website, The 
Intercept, reported recently that Canada’s leading surveillance 
agency is analyzing records of up to fifteen million downloads 
daily to track extremists.4  As a result, it seems likely that the 
Snowden leaks, already considered by many to be the most 
infamous example of whistleblowing of all time, will be a topic 
of American and global conversation for years to come.  
However, what is less clear is what kind of tangible 
legislative change (if any) the Snowden leaks will bring about, 
particularly in countries other than the U.S.  While much has 
been written about how the Snowden leaks have, and will 
continue to, influence American domestic policy and 
American diplomatic and intelligence-sharing arrangements 
with other nations, less has been written about the impact that 
the leaks have had on some of the U.S.’ most important allies.  
This paper analyzes what impact the Snowden leaks have had 
in Canada and the United Kingdom.  Sections one and two 
analyze the impact the Snowden disclosures have had on civil 
society.  In doing so, it notes a glaring lack of parliamentary 
mechanisms for oversight of intelligence activities in Canada 
and also illuminates issues with the existing mechanisms in 
the UK.  Section three examines what, if any, tangible 
legislative outcomes have resulted from the Snowden leaks. It 
concludes that it is difficult to assign any tangible legislative 
                                                 
2 Peter Bradshaw, Citizenfour Review – Gripping Snowden Documentary 
Offers Portrait of Power, Paranoia, and One Remarkable Man, THE 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 16, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/oct/16/citizen-four-
review-edward-snowden-documentary. 
3 James Bamford, Edward Snowden: The Untold Story, WIRED MAG., 
Aug. 22, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-
snowden/. 
4 Ryan Gallagher & Glenn Greenwald, Canada Casts Global 
Surveillance Dragnet Over File Downloads, THE INTERCEPT, Jan. 28, 
2015, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/28/canada-cse-
levitation-mass-surveillance/. 
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outcomes in either country to the leaks.  Finally, in the 
concluding section, recommendations for changes to the 
oversight mechanisms in both countries that may help to 
prevent the reoccurrence of some of the most egregious abuses 
exposed by the Snowden leaks are posited. 
 
I. CANADA – IMPACT OF SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES ON CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
 
 Unsurprisingly, in the aftermath of the Snowden 
disclosures there was a significant amount of material 
published by Canadian academics, legal associations, judges, 
standing committee members, Parliamentarians and the 
media.  This was to be expected as “Snowden’s revelations 
have implicated Canada’s foreign intelligence signals agency – 
the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) – in 
expansive domestic and foreign surveillance initiatives.”5 
Some of these expansive and troubling initiatives, which 
implicated both CSEC and other Canadian officials, include: 
CSEC using airport Wi-Fi to track Canadian travelers;6 CSEC 
setting up hidden spying posts in about twenty countries in 
which it conducted espionage at the behest of the NSA;7 
Canada allowing the NSA to spy on Canadian soil during the 
2010 G8 and G20 Summits;8 Canadian embassies overseas 
                                                 
5 Simon Davies, A Crisis of Accountability: A Global Analysis of the 
Impact of the Snowden Revelations, THE PRIVACY SURGEON 22 (2014), 
https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Snowden-
final-report-for-publication.pdf.  
6 Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, CSEC Used 
Airport Wi-Fi to Track Canadian Travellers: Edward Snowden documents, 
CBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-
used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-
documents-1.2517881.       
7 Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, Snowden 
Document Shows Canada Set Up Posts for NSA, CBC NEWS, Dec. 9, 2013,  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/snowden-document-shows-
canada-set-up-spy-posts-for-nsa-1.2456886.  
8  Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, New Snowden 
Docs Show U.S. Spied During G20 in Toronto, CBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 
2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-
u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448. 
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using eavesdropping technology;9 and, finally, allegations that 
Canadian spies collected metadata of phone calls and e-mails 
to and from Brazil’s Mines and Energy Ministry.10  While these 
are only some examples of deeply worrisome Canadian 
complicity in NSA activity, they underscore one of the most 
significant areas of concern to be expressed by Canadian civil 
society: the deep inter-connection between Canada and the 
United States and the corresponding connection between their 
intelligence activities.  That Canada and the U.S. share deep 
economic, geographic, and cultural ties is no secret, but the 
extreme inter-connectedness of these two countries (and its 
impact on their intelligence-sharing relationships) begs further 
elucidation.  
 Farson and Teeple note that, “[t]he significance of the 
long-standing economic relationship with the U.S. may be 
even greater today for both parties, particularly given that 
other traditional political and military allies are now economic 
competitors.  Certainly, it has become ever more integrated 
with both countries remaining each other’s most significant 
trading partner.”11  Moreover, Farson and Teeple point to 
many other shared linkages between the countries that are 
crucial to their intelligence sharing relationships, namely, 
critical telecommunications and security infrastructure, and 
argue that Canada has been seen as a “freeloader” because of 
the imbalance between the two countries’ differing 
contributions to North American defence and security.12 
Canada, like the UK, is a member of the “Five Eyes” 
community that  
 
                                                 
9 Colin Freeze, Canadian Embassies Eavesdrop, Leak Says, THE GLOBE & 




10 Canadian Spies Targeted Brazil’s Mines Ministry: Report, CBC NEWS 
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canadian-spies-targeted-
brazil-s-mines-ministry-report-1.1927975. 
11 Stuart Farson & Nancy Teeple, Increasing Canada’s Foreign 
Intelligence Capability: Is it a Dead Issue?, INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L 
SECURITY, Vol. 30, 47, 59 (2015). 
12 Id. at 60. 
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pools their resources, divide targets according 
to geographic location and expertise, and share 
analyses. In all cases, the NSA is the big 
brother.  In some instances, it helps fund the 
activities of its partners in order to influence 
intelligence gathering programs. . . . Canada’s 
contribution focuses on the northern regions of 
Russia and China, Latin America, as well the 
northern parts of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans.13 
 
 Academic commentators have criticized various 
aspects of the intelligence sharing relationships between the 
two counties.  Clement has noted that,  
 
[w]ell before the Snowden revelations, CIRA 
commissioned an expert study of the Canadian 
Internet infrastructure, which compared all 
Canadian routings with those that transited the 
United States and found significant 
inefficiencies with the boomerang routing. 
CIRA’s report concluded that Canadian 
Internet access is heavily and unnecessarily 
dependent upon foreign infrastructure, 
especially US infrastructure.14  
 
He laments the fact that much of Canada’s internal Internet 
traffic is routed through the US, noting that the lack of 
international submarine fiber optic cables in Canada means 
that “almost all of Canada’s third country Internet traffic is 
similarly routed through the United States and via NSA 
surveillance operations.”15 While some Canadian Internet 
companies, such as Bell Canada, have seized upon this 
opportunity to offer “safer, more private, domestic” Internet 
                                                 
13 Id. at 63. 
14 Andrew Clement, Canada’s Bad Dream, WORLD POL’Y J., Vol. 31, 25-
33, 30 (2014), available at 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2014/canada's-bad-
dream. 
15  Id. at 27. 
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solutions,16 the post-Snowden climate in Canada still 
represents what Wesley Wark calls a “hopeful and distressing 
reality.”17 According to Wark, it is 
 
[h]opeful in the sense that we can anticipate a 
kind of recalibration of US-led global 
surveillance which might accord with our own 
principles and interests; distressing in that it 
reveals that Canada, enmeshed in its 
dependency on the NSA, and suffering 
problems of endemic secrecy, inadequate laws, 
poor accountability, hands-off political 
leadership, and an ill-informed public, cannot 
make independent headway in coming up with 
our own, applied Snowden verdict on global 
surveillance.18 
 
 Other than the issues noted above, there are several 
obstacles to the effective development and operation of a 
specifically Canadian system of intelligence oversight and 
accountability.  The first is cultural.  As Jeffrey Roy notes, 
 
[t]here is often a tendency in Canada to view 
such activity with a certain detachment and 
smugness: thank goodness that’s not us. Yet, 
almost every significant scandal involving 
government action in the US has been 
accompanied by revelations in Canada that 
public sector authorities are acting in a 
remarkably similar manner.19  
 
The second, more significant obstacle, is the lack of any 
established parliamentary review mechanisms that provide for 
                                                 
16  Id. at 27-28. 
17 Loch K. Johnson et. al, An INS Special Forum: Implications of the 
Snowden Leaks, INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY, Vol. 29, 793-810 
(2014). 
18  Id. 
19 Jeffrey Roy, Secrecy, Security and Digital Literacy in an Era of Meta-
Data: Why the Canadian Westminster Model Falls Short, INTELLIGENCE & 
NAT’L SECURITY, 2-3 (2015). 
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any kind of meaningful oversight or accountability.  As will be 
discussed further below, attempts to set up a National Security 
Committee of Parliamentarians have been stymied for over a 
decade, despite support for such a Committee stemming from 
judicial inquiries, reports of parliamentary committees, civil 
society organizations and the wider legal community.  The 
result is the “absence of such oversight altogether, which is 
how one can reasonable characterize the Canadian model. 
With the partial exception of Ministers directing them, 
Canadian Parliamentarians are shielded from scrutinizing 
security authorities in any direct and meaningful manner.”20 
 In order to more fully understand Canada’s current 
lack of meaningful mechanisms for parliamentary review and 
accountability of intelligence service activities, several stymied 
attempts on behalf of Canadian civil society actors over the 
course of the last decade must be noted.  The first unsuccessful 
attempt to create a novel Parliamentary Committee on 
National Security (composed of both MPs and Senators from 
across party lines) occurred in 2005 under a Liberal minority 
government with the tabling of Bill C-81.21  Despite cross-party 
support, that bill died on the order paper following the 2005 
dissolution of the Canadian Parliament.  The continuing lack 
of effective parliamentary oversight was subsequently 
criticized by two separate, independent judicial reviews 
carried out by Justices O’Connor and Iacobucci pertaining to 
the actions of Canadian officials in the war on terror (in 
particular, CSIS and the RCMP).22  In particular, O’Connor 
noted that the rendition experienced by Maher Arar urgently 
emphasized that Canada was in need of an independent 
national security review framework.  A Standing Committee 
on Public Safety and National Security tasked with reviewing 
Iacobucci and O’Connor’s findings and recommendations 
would later in 2009 find it “regrettable that the government 
                                                 
20 Id. at 7. 
21 Full text, legislative history, and additional information pertaining 
to the bill available at http://openparliament.ca/bills/38-1/C-81/.   
22 Government of Canada Publications, Internal Inquiry into the 
Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad 
Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/bcp-
pco/CP32-90-1-2010-eng.pdf.        
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has not yet established the independent national security 
review framework recommended by Justice O’Connor” and 
argue that said framework was “essential to prevent further 
human rights violations.”23  They forcefully added that “there 
was an urgent need for action” and that without an integrated 
structure for the full review of national security issues, 
Canadians would be at further risk of violations of their rights 
and freedoms.24 
 To this date, no mechanism for parliamentary 
oversight of intelligence or security mechanisms in Canada, 
along the lines of that proposed in Bill C-81 or envisioned by 
Justice O’Connor, exists.25  The ignorance of this alarming lack 
of oversight seems to be a trend continuing through successive 
Canadian governments that now continues under the current 
Conservative government’s administration.  For example, as 
noted by Roy,  
 
[a] report published by the federal Privacy 
Commissioner in early 2014, in line with much 
of the earlier analysis of the Canadian 
apparatus, calls for fundamental political 
reforms too ineffective or simply absent 
mechanisms for overseeing the data gathering 
activities of Canadian federal authorities as well 
as the public and private sectors more widely. 
                                                 
23 Ottawa Standing Committee on Public Safety and National 
Security, Review of the Findings and Recommendations Arising from the 
Iacobucci and O’Connor Inquiries, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId
=4004074. 
24 Id. at 11-17.  Recommendation five of this report states that, “[t]he 
Committee recommends, once again, that Bill C-81, introduced in the 
38th Parliament, An Act to Establish the National Security 
Committee of Parliamentarians, or a variation of it, be introduced in 
Parliament at the earliest opportunity.” 
25 Two Bills (S-220, infra note 32, and C-551, infra note 33) have been 
introduced in both the House and the Senate that continue the work 
of Bill C-81, although neither bill has made any kind of significant 
progress.  For example, Bill C-551 was introduced into the House in 
November of 2013 and has yet to progress, while Bill S-220 was 
introduced into the Senate in May 2014 and has still yet to pass 
Second Reading.  Id.  
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The report was widely applauded by Canadian 
security experts, though largely ignored by the 
Government itself.26  
 
It is within this context of ignorance that the concerns of 
Canadian civil society echo even louder. The Protect Our 
Privacy Coalition, which is made up of more than fifty civil 
society organisations, has launched an online initiative calling 
on Members of Parliament to introduce restrictions that would 
curtail CSEC’s most egregious abuses.27  Moreover, the British 
Columbia Civil Liberties Association is constitutionally 
challenging aspects of CSEC’s legal and operational 
framework,28 and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association has 
also launched a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of 
PIPEDA, Canada’s federal data protection statute.29  
Moreover, the Privacy Commissioner has released a statement 
regarding telecommunications companies’ responses to 
information requests from government authorities, in which a 
number of recommendations are made, particularly in regards 
to the transparency of authorized disclosures.30  
 In addition to these civil society actors, a number of 
interested Members of Canadian Parliament have tried to 
push for additional debate pertaining to CSEC’s activities and 
Canada’s glaring lack of parliamentary overview of 
                                                 
26 Roy, supra note 19 at 17-18. 
27 See OPEN MEDIA, https://openmedia.ca/ourprivacy (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2015).   
28 The litigation is ongoing. See Globe Editorial, Hey CSEC, Stop 
Spying on Me, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 2, 2014, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/dont-
spy-on-me-csec/article17781948.   
29 The litigation is ongoing. See Alex Boutilier, Canadian Civil Liberties 
Group Launches Court Challenge on Warrantless Access, THE TORONTO 




30 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Statement from 
the Interim Privacy Commissioner of Canada Regarding 
Telecommunications Companies’ Responses to Information Requests from 
Government Authorities, https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-
c/2014/s-d_140430_e.asp. 
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intelligence activities.  In calling for an emergency debate on 
CSEC’s meta-data collection program, MP Charmaine Borg 
argued that, 
 
[a]n emergency debate is needed so that 
parliamentarians can take an in-depth look at 
the extent to which Canadians' personal 
information, metadata and other information 
are collected by the police, law enforcement 
agencies and national security agencies.  This 
debate is also needed so that we can look at 
measures that will lead to appropriate 
parliamentary oversight and ways to balance 
public and national security interests with 
Canadians' privacy rights.31   
 
Moreover, as aforementioned, interested members of 
Parliament have introduced two bills (S-22032 and C-55133) in 
order to further the work of C-81 and create a Parliamentary 
Committee for the oversight of national security and 
intelligence activities.  The current Canadian government’s 
response (or lack thereof) to the various efforts of academics 
and other civil society actors outlined in this section will be 
considered in this paper’s subsequent analysis of tangible 




II. UNITED KINGDOM – IMPACT OF SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES 
ON CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
                                                 
31 Charmaine Borg on Request for Emergency Debate, June 13, 2013, 
http://openparliament.ca/debates/2013/6/13/charmaine-borg-
1/only/.     




33 National Security Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=6256801&L
anguage=E&Mode=1.   
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 Whereas the Snowden disclosures in Canada and the 
United States sparked widespread civil society debate and 
condemnation, reaction to the disclosures in the United 
Kingdom has been markedly different, particularly in regards 
to the responses from the political classes.  As Martin Moore 
notes, 
 
[t]he reaction in the UK has to date been 
startlingly different.  The political class jointly 
defended the actions of the security services, 
and most shied away from proposing reform of 
the law. The press was split on their response, 
some recommending prosecution of the 
messenger, The Guardian. . . . It is difficult to 
explain why the reaction in the two countries 
has been so different.  No doubt partly it is 
cultural, and partly due to contrasting public 
attitudes in the UK and US to the role of the 
state. It must also be due in part to the UK’s 
intelligence services’ importance to its 
international status.  Intelligence remains one 
area where the UK is considered, in terms of 
expertise and performance, to be on a par with 
global superpowers.34  
 
As was the case with CSEC in Canada, the material disclosed 
by Snowden implicated the UK’s counterpart GCHQ 
(Government Communications Head Quarters) in various 
spying activities. Mark Young notes that, “British government 
concerns about the potential publication of classified data 
were significant enough to threaten The Guardian with legal 
action if the information was not destroyed.  The threats 
prompted the destruction of hard drives containing 
information related to GCHQ.”35 
                                                 
34 Martin Moore, RIP RIPA? Snowden, Surveillance, and the 
Inadequacies of our Existing Legal Framework, THE POL. Q., Vol. 85, No. 
2, 125-132, 125-126 (2014). 
35 Mark Young, National Insecurity: The Impacts of Illegal Disclosures of 
Classified Information, I/S: A J. OF LAW & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y, 
Vol. 10, 367, 368 (2014). 
COWARDLY TRAITOR OR HEROIC WHISTLEBLOWER?              102 
 
 The United Kingdom has been placed in a particularly 
precarious position by the Snowden disclosures because of its 
relationship with the European Union.  As was the case with 
Canada and the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
European Union share a vast inter-connectedness in several 
fields, including intelligence sharing and gathering.  For 
instance, Bauman notes that, “[t]he UK has been in an 
especially delicate position given that GCHQ has participated 
in aggressive behavior against other partners and EU 
institutions while being part of the European Union and 
having signed the EU treaty which requires member states’ 
loyalty.”36  Again, similar to what was the case in Canada and 
the United States, much of Europe’s Internet traffic is routed 
through the United Kingdom. As Brown and Korff note, the 
UK 
 
is the landing point for the majority of 
transatlantic fibre-optic cables.  GCHQ has 
reportedly placed data interceptors on fibre-
optic cables conveying internet data in and out 
of the UK, and are able to store a significant 
fraction of global Internet traffic for three days 
on a rolling basis while carrying out further 
automated analysis.37  
 
Despite Canada’s connections to the United States, and the 
UK’s connection to Europe, it is clear that the NSA and the 
GCHQ have invested more resources in their activities than 
any other organisations on earth.  As Bauman notes, 
 
[t]he NSA has a budget of US $10.8 bn (7.8 bn 
Euros) a year, whereas within Europe GCHQ’s 
budget of 1.2 bn Euros is well below the NSA, 
but nevertheless over twice the yearly budget of 
other agencies such as BND, FRA, or DGSE. 
This is why it may be more accurate to speak of 
                                                 
36 Zygmunet Bauman et. al, After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of 
Surveillance, INT’L POL. SOC., Vol. 8, 121-144, 127 (2014). 
37 Ian Brown & Douwe Korff, Foreign Surveillance: Law and Practice in 
a Global Digital Environment, EUROPEAN HUM. RTS L. REV., Vol. 3, 243-
251, 243 (2014). 
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an Anglo-American guild of professionals 
extended to other Western intelligence services 
than to analyze the network as a US-European 
collaboration on an equal footing, or even a 
transatlantic collaboration correlated with 
NATO.38 
 
 Unlike Canada, the United Kingdom does have various 
mechanisms for oversight of national security and intelligence 
activities, which has led to a variety of pre and post-Snowden 
analyses and recommendations for change.  As Sudha Setty 
notes, 
 
[n]umerous parliamentary committees have 
undertaken investigations of the surveillance 
apparatus in the United Kingdom.  A broad 
investigation by the Constitution Committee 
led to findings in 2009 that the intelligence-
gathering services were largely compliant with 
the law, but that report included numerous 
recommendations for changes to surveillance 
authority and transparency, including giving 
greater consideration to civil liberties before 
implementing further surveillance programs, 
granting greater authority to various 
commissioners to exercise increased oversight, 
revisiting existing legislation to increase 
specificity in the surveillance authority, and 
making the work of the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal more transparent.39  
 
Writing in Martin Moore’s piece, Jenna Stratford, QC agrees 
that there are flaws with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 
namely that “[w]here complaints are rejected, as the huge 
majority unsurprisingly are, claimants are not given proper 
reasons but instead the judicial equivalent of a ‘neither 
confirm nor deny’ notice. In addition, at present there is no 
possibility of appeal from the Tribunal’s decisions, so that 
                                                 
38 Bauman, supra note 36. 
39 Sudha Setty, Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful 
Accountability, 51 STAN. J. INT'L L. 69 (2015). 
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probably the only recourse is to Strasbourg.”40  Furthermore, 
the Intelligence and Security Committee considered whether 
GCHQ’s receipt of information by the NSA from the PRISM 
program was legal, ultimately finding that the GCHQ’s 
actions were compliant with the statutory framework, but 
concluding that the framework required additional 
specificity.41 
 A further complication arises in the United Kingdom 
because of the operation of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act (RIPA).42  As Setty notes, under the operation of 
this act, 
 
[t]he sole recourse for challenging such actions 
under U.K. law is making a claim to the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal and that, 
although the Human Rights Act 1998 
incorporates the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) into U.K. domestic 
law, if the judiciary believes that a national 
security measure is incompatible with the 
ECHR standard, it may declare incompatibility 
but this does not constitute a mandate that the 
domestic security apparatus change its policies.  
As such, review at the domestic level has often 
been sharply curtailed.43  
 
RIPA has been criticized by many as an outdated piece of 
legislation that does not fit the current realities of our 
technologically advanced world.  Lord Ken Macdonald QC, 
who was the Director of Public Prosecutions in England and 
Wales from 2003-2008, argues that RIPA “was not written in 
the age of social media and big data. It is inherently 
                                                 
40 Moore, supra note 34. 
41 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Statement on 
GCHQ’s Alleged Interception of Communications under the US PRISM 
Programme, July 17, 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/file/225459/ISC-Statement-on-GCHQ.pdf. 
42 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/contents. 
43 Setty, supra note 39. 
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backwardlooking” and Jenna Straford echoes this sentiment 
by stating that, “RIPA contains only limited restrictions on the 
transfer of data to third-party powers. The Secretary of State 
has extremely wide discretion—almost unfettered in 
practice—to determine whether data may be transferred.”44 
 Despite the aforementioned varying responses by the 
media and political classes following the Snowden revelations, 
members of UK civil society have taken issue with the political 
responses of the UK Government in the post-Snowden era.  In 
the Institute for Public Policy Research’s Study Democracy in 
Britain, Lord Macdonald argues that revelations about the 
GCHQ’s Project Tempora 
 
point, perhaps, to an excessive and therefore 
damaging devotion to secrecy that appears to 
trump the right, even of parliament, to have a 
basic say in our security arrangements. The 
apparent manner of its conception and the 
government’s response to its being revealed is 
each troubling for the light it casts on questions 
of oversight and democratic accountability.45  
 
For Lord Macdonald, one of the most troubling aspects of 
what the Snowden disclosures revealed was that the GCHQ 
developed these capabilities while Government arguments to 
enact them in legislation were being successfully defeated in 
Parliament. As he notes, “[w]e are witnessing the creation of a 
very broad surveillance scheme by the backdoor – as 
successive governments have failed to persuade parliament 
that such schemes are justified or desirable – and a 
simultaneous growth in capacity and ambition on the part of 
GCHQ in the complete absence of debate, still less 
legislation.”46  Lord Macdonald refers to recent government 
attempts to suggest that Tempora is implicitly authorized by 
RIPA as “deeply unconvincing,” questioning how it was 
possible that, “[i]f Chris Huhne is to be believed, the cabinet 
                                                 
44 Moore, supra note 34. 
45 Guy Lodge & Glenn Gottfried (eds.), Democracy in Britain: Essays in 
Honour of James Cornford, INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. (LONDON: UNITED 
KINGDOM) 173 (2014). 
46 Id. at 174. 
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and national security council did know [about Tempora].  
They were never told.”47 
 Similarly, the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee released a seething report pertaining to the current 
UK mechanisms for intelligence oversight,48 in which it 
criticized members of the British civil service – particularly the 
National Security Adviser and the head of MI5 – for refusing 
to give evidence.49  While the Committee did acknowledge 
that the Justice and Security Act50 made some changes to the 
Intelligence and Security Committee, it still concluded that, 
 
[w]e do not believe the current system of 
oversight is effective and we have concerns that 
the weak nature of that system has an impact 
upon the credibility of the agencies 
accountability, and to the credibility of 
Parliament itself.  Whilst we recognize the 
importance of limiting the access to documents 
of a confidential nature . . . engagement with 
elected representatives is not, in itself, a danger 
to national security and to continue to insist so 
is hyperbole.51  
 
It also levied several criticisms towards the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal and RIPA,52 and called it “unacceptable” that 
there was so much confusion around the work of the 
Intelligence Services Commissioner.53  In doing so, they made 
a number of recommendations that will be considered further 
in this paper’s subsequent (and concluding) section on 
recommendations for change.  
                                                 
47 Id. at 175. 
48 HOUSE OF COMMONS HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, COUNTER-
TERRORISM: SEVENTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2013-14, 66 [hereinafter 




50 Justice and Security Act 2013 c. 18, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/contents/enacted. 
51 Home Affairs Committee 17th Report, supra note 48. 
52 Id. at 63-4, 70-71. 
53 Id. at 66. 
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III. CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM – THE IMPACT OF 
THE SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES ON TANGIBLE LEGISLATIVE 
OUTCOMES 
 
 Andrew Clement has argued that, “[h]ow Canada 
responds to the NSA-Snowden crisis will define its identity 
and shape its future for decades to come.”54  Unfortunately, if 
the early returns are a sign of things to come, Canada is not on 
its way to responding to the Snowden disclosures in any kind 
of comprehensive or definitive manner.  Granted, in the first 
section of this paper, several attempts were made by members 
of Canadian civil society to point to a glaring lack of 
parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities.  As noted in 
A Crisis of Accountability, a joint publication published in 
association with the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for 
Information Law and the Vrije Universiteit of Brussels, 
“[w]hile the net result has led to a greater understanding of 
CSEC’s activities and objectives, there has been minimal 
concrete movement towards reform aside from some early 
judicial proceedings.”55  It is still unknown at this point 
whether either of the aforementioned constitutional challenges 
launched by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 
or the Canadian Civil Liberties Association will lead to fruitful 
reform.  Despite a very active civil society, responses from the 
current Conservative government have been sparse.  
Hopes for future tangible legislative outcomes are 
further called into question by the past track record of 
successive Canadian governments.  For over a decade now, 
various iterations of Bill C-81 (which would enact a National 
Security Committee of Parliamentarians to provide some form 
of parliamentary scrutiny of intelligence activities) have died 
in successive Canadian parliaments, despite cross-party 
support in 2005 at the time of the bill’s inception.  At that time, 
political instability associated with successive minority 
governments (and the corresponding dissolution of 
Parliament) could easily be assigned blame for the demise of 
Bill C-81. However, as Roy Notes, “[i]f partisan collaboration 
is rare and tenuous during minority regimes, it is quickly 
                                                 
54 Clement, supra note 27. 
55 Davies, supra note 5, at 22. 
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forgotten once majority status is returned since the victors see 
little compelling reasoning in sharing unfettered power with 
its now-defeated opponents.”56  The aforementioned current 
iterations of the bills (Bills S-220 and C-551) have been moving 
through Parliament at a snail’s pace, despite the impetus placed 
on them by the Snowden revelations.  Even before the 
Snowden revelations, two separate judicial inquiries by 
Justices Iacobucci and O’Connor (both of which attracted 
significant public attention) called attention to an alarming 
lack of parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities in 
Canada.  To date, the recommendations of these inquiries have 
still not been taken up by the Canadian government, despite 
the fact that the Standing Committee on Public Safety and 
National Security has reiterated their importance. While 
Canadians often enjoy debating the potential shortcomings of 
the US Congressional model, “other likeminded democracies 
have or are also forging more robust oversight and review 
mechanisms that are likely to prove increasingly consequential 
in balancing competing interests of security, secrecy and 
privacy in an environment of digital connectedness and 
information abundance.”57  Canada can ill-afford to stay 
stagnant in a world that continues to evolve and produce new 
digital realities. Nor can it afford to hope that its civil society 
or its courts will spur the Canadian government to action.  
To contrast, the issue in the UK is certainly not a lack of 
parliamentary oversight mechanisms of intelligence activities, 
but rather the appropriate means through which existing 
legislation and mechanisms should be refined.  For the most 
part, the UK Government has responded with silence and 
secrecy, even going so far as to attack The Guardian and force 
them to destroy material that would be damaging to the 
GCHQ. It has been noted that, “Deputy Prime Minister Nick 
Clegg has ordered an ’Obama-style’ review of intelligence 
agencies, to be led by the Royal United Services Institute, but 
the report will not even be released until after the May 2015 
elections.”58  As a result of this government response, Brown 
and Korff have argued that, “[i]t seems judicial intervention 
will be required to bring the UK’s legal framework back into 
                                                 
56 Roy, supra note 19 at 8. 
57 Id. at 22. 
58 Davies, supra note 5, 70. 
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compliance with the Human Rights Convention.”59  As noted 
above by Setty, even successful litigation may not bring about 
effective change because of the UK’s complex arrangements 
under RIPA, the European Convention for Human Rights and 
the Human Rights Act.  As a result, “[w]ithout a Snowden-like 
disclosure to enable such review, or a strong commitment by 
the United Kingdom to abide by the human rights standards 
articulated at the European level, parliamentary oversight 
would be the key mechanism to protect against overreaching 
by the British intelligence community.”60 
If parliamentary oversight is to be the key mechanism 
to protect against future overreaching of the British 
intelligence community, then the recommendations put 
forward by UK civil society members, in particular Lord 
Macdonald and the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, need to be taken seriously.  While some may 
argue that the 2013 Justice and Security Act attempted to do 
just that,61 others are more skeptical.  As Lord Macdonald 
notes, 
 
[t]he Justice and Security Act passed last year 
handed marginally more power to the ISC, but 
did little to correct executive control over it.  
For example, each committee member is now 
appointed by parliament but must first be 
nominated for membership by the prime 
minister.  The ISC now has the power to call for 
evidence or information from ministers and 
agencies; however, the means and manner in 
which information can be provided to the ISC 
must be outlined through a memorandum of 
understanding with the prime minister.  In the 
                                                 
59 Brown & Korff, supra note 37 at 6. 
60 Setty, supra note 39 at 28. 
61 Home Affairs Committee 17th Report, supra note 48 at 62. “A 
number of witnesses to this inquiry took the opportunity to highlight 
the improvements to the Intelligence and Security Committee which 
were contained within the Justice and Security Act 2013.  There were 
suggestions that the committee ought not to be judged on its 
previous failures but rather time ought to be given to see how it 
worked under the new regime.” Id. 
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light of the Snowden revelations, it seems that 
reforms in the J&S Act did not go far enough.  
Moreover, we also need to consider the extent 
to which RIPA can be said to remain an 
adequate mechanism for regulating 
surveillance activities.62  
 
Even if one accepts the argument that the Justice and Security 
Act was an attempt to respond to deficiencies in the oversight 
of intelligence activities, this paper has noted the concerns of 
several academics and civil society actors pertaining to various 
other pieces of legislation and mechanisms, including RIPA 
and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, that have not been 
consequentially amended by that Act.  These still require 
further attention on the part of the UK Government before any 
true tangible legislative outcome can be assessed to the 
Snowden disclosures. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION – RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
CHANGE 
 
 Despite the apparent conclusion that neither the 
Canadian nor the UK government has responded to the 
Edward Snowden disclosures with tangible, consequential 
legislative changes, it cannot be said that these disclosures 
have had no impact.  The revelations provided for by the 
Snowden documents have fundamentally changed public 
perceptions in both countries about how intelligence activities 
are carried out and have sparked civil society commentary 
amongst academics, judges, legal practitioners, interest groups 
and the media pertaining to how oversight of intelligence 
communities should be improved in the future.  The immense 
energy and analysis that has gone into these various 
commentaries should not be lost.  As Wesley Wark argues, 
 
[w]hatever badge we stick to Mr. Snowden 
(and his media collaborators) may in itself not 
matter very much, and certainly will be 
dwarfed by the issue that he has called our 
                                                 
62 Lodge & Gottfried, supra note 45 at 176.  
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attention to.  That issue is the practice, and 
future, of global electronic surveillance by state 
intelligence agencies.  The ultimate verdict(s) 
regarding Edward Snowden the man will pale 
in significance alongside the verdict(s) on 
global surveillance.63  
 
With that in mind, this paper will now conclude by reiterating 
some of the most important changes that urgently need to be 
considered by both Canada and the UK going forward into a 
post-Snowden future.  
 For Canada, the most urgently needed change required 
is clear: the work of Bill C-81 needs to be fast-tracked through 
its current iterations, either Bill S-220 or C-551, so that the 
country may finally have some form of parliamentary review 
and oversight of intelligence activities.  The Canadian 
government should not need to be implored to do this through 
damaging revelations of sensitive material, which will 
undoubtedly continue in the future (as noted at the outset of 
this paper, a new Intercept story pertaining to CSEC’s spying 
was released only recently).  Various successive Canadian 
governments have for too long ignored a glaring deficiency in 
Canada’s overall national security apparatus.  Two separate 
judicial inquiries have been commissioned (at no small 
expense to the Canadian taxpayer) and both have 
recommended the immediate need for additional review 
mechanisms.  These recommendations have been further 
bolstered by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and 
National Security, and have been demanded by various civil 
society actors noted in this paper.  The Canadian government 
is poised to introduce a whole new set of anti-terrorism laws 
that it has been working on since last year’s attack on 
Parliament Hill.64  There is growing concern that this new 
package of laws will actually increase powers of various 
                                                 
63 Loch K. Johnson et. al, An INS Special Forum: Implications of the 
Snowden Leaks, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, Vol. 29, 793-
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64 Jim Bronskill, Five Things to Know About Canada’s New Anti-
terrorism Measures, CTV NEWS, Jan. 30, 2015, 
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intelligence and police agencies.65  These concerns are further 
exacerbated by the fact that Canada has no genuine 
accountability mechanisms for the oversight of these agencies, 
or for its national security apparatus as a whole.  It is simply 
irresponsible for the Canadian government to go forward with 
new counter-terrorism legislation without addressing this 
glaring gap in its current national security framework.  
 In contrast to Canada, the United Kingdom is 
significantly ahead in regards to existing infrastructure for 
parliamentary oversight and accountability of intelligence 
activities.  That being said, there are a number of targeted 
recommendations for change that could significantly improve 
these oversight mechanisms, were they to be acted upon by 
the UK government.  In particular, Lord Macdonald suggests 
six additional reforms: 1) The ISC should become a full joint 
parliamentary select committee; 2) it should be appointed by 
and responsible to both Houses of Parliament; 3) it should 
have stronger powers to obtain evidence.  These should 
include the power to obtain information, by summons, from 
outside parties, lay experts, ministers and civil servants, as 
well as from security chiefs; 4) it should have an independent 
secretariat and independent legal advice, and it should have 
access to all information.  Select committee procedures already 
allow the exclusion of material whose publication might be 
harmful and the disclosure of such material is a serious 
criminal offence; 5) it’s chair should be a member of the 
opposition and should not be someone who has previously 
held responsibility for any of the security agencies; 6) Finally, 
we need to increase the level of institutional expertise to 
ensure that human rights are put at the heart of policy and 
strategies in this area, at a level that is more than rhetorical.  
We need to consider how such a committee could develop a 
wider role in educating parliament as a whole and, 
consequently, the public.66 
 Similarly, the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee makes a number of recommendations that echo 
those of Lord Macdonald. They also believed that there were 
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NEWS, Jan. 30, 2015, http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/spy-service-
to-get-stronger-under-federal-bill-1.2213119. 
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several ways in which the ISC could be strengthened: 1) 
election of the membership of the Committee by the House of 
Commons; 2) the Chair of the Committee being a member of 
the Opposition and not a former Minister with responsibility 
for any of the agencies; 3) ensuring that the Committee has 
access to relevant expertise (for instance in terms of the 
technological aspect of the work carried out by the security 
and intelligence agencies); 4) allowing other Parliamentary 
Committees to scrutinize the work of the security and 
intelligence agencies.67  The Committee also recommended 
that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal be legislatively 
compelled to produce an annual report on their work, 
containing at the very least the number of cases it has received 
and the outcome of cases determined in that year.68  Finally, in 
regards to RIPA, the Committee argued that, 
 
[g]iven the criticism which the Regulation of 
the Investigatory Powers Act is subject to, we 
believe that the legislation is in need of review.  
We recommend that a Joint Committee of both 
Houses of Parliament should be appointed in 
order to hold an inquiry with the ability to take 
evidence on the Act with a view to updating it.  
This inquiry would aim to bring the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act up to date with 
modern technology, reduce the complexity (and 
associated difficulty in the use of) the 
legislation, strengthen the statistical and 
transparency requirements and improve the 
oversight functions as are set out in the current 
Act.69 
 
 Although both Canada and the UK have very different 
starting points for how they should oversee their intelligence 
activities in the future, the motive behind both is the same. 
Civil society confidence in the ability of both governments to 
protect the privacy of their citizens reached an all-time low 
following the Snowden disclosures. As is noted by Bauman, 
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[o]nly 5% of respondents in Canada trust 
government to guard their data, and this only 
rises to 7% in the United States. Whether in the 
United States, Canada, or the UK, it is clear 
from these results that a substantial proportion 
of the population are concerned about 
government surveillance and that there is a 
high degree of cynicism about what 
governments do with those data.70  
 
Members of civil society in both countries are doing what they 
can to compel their governments to act, but there is only so 
much they can do if their governments are unwilling.  Both 
Canada and the UK need to start treating the Snowden 
disclosures as an opportunity to reassess how they collect 
intelligence, when they collect intelligence, who they share 
intelligence with and, perhaps most importantly, how they 
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